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CHAPTER I. DISABILITY AND INTRAFAMILIAL TIME ALLOCATION 
The ability to perform physical tasks is obviously affected by 
the state of one's health. Econometric studies verify the presumption 
that individuals with physical and mental impairments tend to work less 
and earn lower wages than individuals in otherwise similar circumstances 
who are healthy. Most empirical studies have concentrated on labor 
supply aspects of disabled individuals and most researchers have 
ignored the intrafamilial adjustments to poor health. 
In those cases where the individual experiencing the impairment is 
the head of a household, the lower earnings and potential disability 
benefits resulting from reduced mental and physical ability may prompt 
a shift in time use among family members. The head of the household may 
withdraw from the labor force and be replaced as a wage earner by the 
spouse or other family members. This type of reallocation of time among 
individuals and activities is particularly attractive to workers who 
qualify for disability benefits which are contingent on the absence of 
significant labor market earnings by the recipient. Alternatively, non-
wage income (which does not reduce disability benefits to the recipient 
or other family members) may become the major income source. 
The Impact of Poor Health on Employment and Earnings 
Empirical evidence indicates that the overall impact of poor health 
on earnings is large. According to Luft (1975, p. 43), the average 
2 
disabled man aged 18 to 64 years experiences a 37 percent reduction in 
yearly earnings. Poor health affects all the components of earnings: 
*1 
labor force participation, annual weeks worked, and hourly earnings 
(Luft, 1975, 1978). Black men are more likely to withdraw from the 
labor force or work fewer weeks than white men. The latter adjust by 
taking larger cuts In hourly wages, and therefore earnings. If the 
comparison Is among working men. Whites are able to shift to alterna­
tive jobs with which their disabilities do not Interfere. Blacks do 
not have this flexibility; their lower education and the effects of 
discrimination seem to make alternative jobs difficult to find. 
Luft (1975) Interprets these findings as being consistent with Impaired 
Blacks having low paying jobs; therefore, when they experience poor 
health they cannot trade off Income for less painful work. As a result. 
Blacks are more likely than whites to be forced out of the labor market 
if they are ill (Luft, 1975, 1978). There is evidence to suggest 
that whites, in general, may be better able to adapt in the labor 
market to long-term disability (Scheffler and Iden, 1974). 
According to Schechter (1977), pre-onset work status varies with 
type of employment. In the case of severely and occupâtlonally 
disabled, industries staffed by operatives and craftsmen have lower 
rates of retention than other sectors. It appears that in some cases 
disability also causes shifts in the type of work performed. 
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Aspects of Work Adjustment 
In the case of severe or total disability,| withdrawal from the 
labor force may be necessary, but not all disabilities totally prevent 
work. Some reduce the productivity of the worker and/or the amount of 
time spent on the job. A general hypothesis is that a decrease in the 
marginal productivity of the worker would shift the demand curve to 
the left decreasing the equilibrium wage rate and, as a result, lower­
ing the income position of the family. The first of these two effects, 
the wage effect, would be expected to reduce work effort while the 
latter, the income effect, would tend to Increase labor market activity 
of the family as a unit. 
Income adjustments 
Using 1972 data, Schechter (1977) finds that families (particularly 
the spouse) of severely disabled men are almost twice as likely to 
Increase work after onset of the disability as are wives of men with 
secondary work limitations. According to the 1971 reports of recently 
disabled persons, Frohlich (1975) finds that about half of the recently 
disabled report no change in family income since the onset of their 
disability. Of the remaining half, more report lower than higher 
income. The survey was conducted in the summer of 1971 with income 
amounts and sources of income received being measured for 1970. The 
recency of disability refers to the period from October 1969 to March 
1971 thus allowing income adjustment to have taken place. The mean 
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family Income of recently disabled In the study Is approximately 
$1000 less than the mean family income for the general population. The 
severely disabled average less than and married persons average more 
than the mean of the total sample. Among disabled individuals, the 
mean income of the nonmarried is less than half of the mean of the 
married with married women averaging more than married men. 
Earnings are the most important source of income for the recently 
disabled household unit. It appears that spouses' earnings largely 
account for these findings, but personal earnings of the disabled also 
contribute. The second most important source of income is public 
income payments. Social security benefits and public assistance 
payments are the main sources. Persons with no earnings or low 
earnings—usually the unmarried or severely disabled—are more likely 
to receive such income. Other less important sources of income are 
assets and private pensions and contributions. As might be expected, 
because of earnings limits on eligibility, beneficiaries of social 
security payments, in general, receive considerably more of their 
income from public income programs, assets, and private pensions than 
nonbeneficiaries. 
Adjustment by retirement and nonparticipation in the labor force 
Among white married men aged 58-63, Quinn (1977a) finds that 
health status and current eligibility for social security and other 
pensions are the most important determinants of early retirement. 
Existence of a health limitation is the single most important reason 
5 
for early retirement among these men with eligibility for social 
security being the second most important factor. Social security 
eligibility alone is responsible for lowering the participation 
probability by 11.3 points. Although social security eligibility 
reduces the participation probabilities of those both with.and without 
health limitations, when the sample is disaggregated by health status 
the effect of social security payments alone is nearly eight times 
larger for those with a limitation than those without. To a lesser 
degree, the same is true for those with private pension plans. 
Quinn (1977b) also finds evidence that retirement probabilities 
are lower in tight labor markets, but the effect was not statistically 
significant for persons with health limitations when the data were 
disaggregated. This may be due to sample selection bias since farmers 
and other self-employed workers are excluded from the sample as are 
the seriously ill. 
Lando (1974) finds a strong relationship between labor market 
conditions and the volume of Disability Insurance (DI) applications. 
Changes in the unemployment rates explain part of the variation in both 
the number of DI applications and the proportion of the insured 
population applying for benefits. 
Health and family time allocation 
Parsons (1977) has conducted a comprehensive study of family time 
allocation. He emphasizes the role of family structure in the relation­
ship between health, labor supply and earnings. Initially, a sample of 
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men 45 to 59 was used to answer the question of whether married men 
have a different labor supply response to poor health than do men who 
are either single or married without spouse present. He finds the 
differences in behavior by health status to be dramatic. The hours 
reduction for married men is 34, 172, and 1222 hours for good, fair, 
and poor health, respectively. For men without spouse present, 158, 
391 and 1677 hours for good, fair, and poor health, respectively, 
are reported. Married men contract their annual hours in the 
market by 61 percent while single men contract their work hours by 
84 percent. 
Using the same sample. Parsons measures the effects of other 
income on male labor supply, and effects of male labor supply on other 
Income, using simultaneous methods (two-stage least squares). Findings 
indicate that other income is substantially higher for men with healthy, 
well-educated spouses, and that other income increases at an increasing 
rate with wife's education. However, If the wife has a limited 
ability due to health, other family Income is reduced by an average 
of more than $5000. Additionally, it appears that the effect of male 
labor supply on other Income is large, but short of fully compensating 
the worker in poor health. Indications are that other income increases 
by about $0.75 for every one-hour reduction in male hours worked. 
Parsons cautiously interprets these results as suggesting that male 
hours affect the earnings behavior of other family members and the 
flow of transfer payments, but are not themselves affected by the 
size of other income flows. 
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The simultaneous estimation is repeated for married men and other 
income is redefined as other earned family income only. Income then 
increases by $130, $235 and $182 as health goes from excellent to good 
to poor, respectively. Now a loss of one hour worked by the head is 
offset by about a $0.23 increase In the earned income of other family 
members. Parsons concludes that most of the income compensation for 
health induced variation in husband work hours results from transfer 
payments and not from work adjustments of other family members. 
Finally, he concludes that other family members do not go into the 
market in a strong and systematic way when the head becomes ill. He 
attributes this to fixed costs of entering the labor market and an 
assumed increased home time demand of the wife while the husband is 
ill. No mention is made of earnings limits associated with public 
income payments and no information was available to test home-market 
time trade-offs in this sample. Additionally, the model is mlsspecifled, 
since he does not take into account the interaction between race and 
other independent variables in the model. 
A time budget sample is used for the second part of Parsons' 
(1977) study. He investigates health and home time allocation—house­
hold cooking, cleaning and maintenance versus labor market time. 
Two major problems remain though; no measure of leisure or self-
employed time is available. Parsons finds that the husband's health 
status has no effect on his home work hours, although poor health of 
his wife leads to an Increase in home work hours. The husband appears. 
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on average, to Increase his home work hours by about 200 hours in this 
latter case. Illness of the spouse causes men to Increase home time 
and women to increase their market work time. Parsons conjectures 
that these time reallocations come largely from leisure time. 
Summary 
As no doubt has been noted, many aspects of poor health have 
been investigated. Yet none of the studies has accomplished, even 
individually, the aim of this study. This analysis takes into account 
sample selection bias, income and social security taxes, and the 
actual measurement of the trade-off in intrafamlllal time allocation— 
including leisure time and time in self-employment in addition to 
market time and household production time. This study is based upon 
a sample from which generalizations to the national population of 
families can be made. 
Lower wages, from reduced marginal productivity in the presence 
of poor health, reduce the opportunity cost of alternative uses of 
time and encourage disabled workers to reduce time in the labor market. 
However, lower wages also reduce income and encourage people to work 
more. If disabled workers can recoup most of the income loss from 
not working or from reduced earnings by qualifying for DI and other 
public income payment programs, the economic incentive may be to reduce 
market work even more or withdraw from the labor market completely to 
stay within earnings limits for receipt of benefits. 
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For persons who are members of a family, the lower earnings and 
potential public income payments resulting from the disability of 
the head may encourage a shift in labor force participation among family 
members. The net result may well be to replace the head of the house­
hold as wage earner by a spouse or other family members. In the case 
where the spouse may qualify for benefits by caring for a dependent 
child, she too may be encouraged to work less or not at all because 
eligibility is contingent on absence of significant labor market 
activity by recipients of DI benefits, but is unaffected by alternative 
forms of income. The effect of poor health on labor supply and earnings 
must be viewed in the context of intrafamilial time allocation. 
As yet uninvestigated are the economic and social effects of 
disability on intrafamilial time allocation. The family simultaneously 
demands and supplies its members' time. Household labor, self-employ­
ment labor, and leisure of the head and spouse are quantities demanded 
(of the input time) by the household. The allocation of time to the 
market for a wage is the supply of labor to the market by the household. 
The Problem 
Disability Insurance (DI) payments are reduced as the earnings 
of the family are increased. The benefit structure embodies a 
penalty—a reduction in benefits—for wage income earned in the market 
by the disabled head and/or other family members who receive dependents' 
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benefits. If a disabled head of household, who has been out of the 
wage market and receiving disability benefits, reenters the labor 
market for a wage, the penalty rate is 100 percent of the benefits 
received and benefit payments cease. As long as the head is disabled 
and entitled to disability benefits, dependents are eligible for 
benefits up to an initial earnings limit. Then the base subsidy is 
reduced by one dollar for every two dollars earned up to a second 
earnings limit. For earnings greater than the second limit, benefits 
are reduced by one dollar for every one dollar earned. Asset income 
from a family owned and operated business or farm, as well as from 
investment in financial instruments, does not reduce the amount of 
benefit payments received. 
There are several economic consequences of such a benefit structure: 
2 income, substitution, and displacement effects. There is a disincen­
tive for the head ta return to work for a wage once disability entitle­
ment is approved. The disincentive to work for a wage is somewhat 
lessened for the dependents. If entrepreneurial skills and other 
resources such as land or physical capital are available to the disabled 
head or family, there is a substitution from market work for a wage to 
^If a person, whose condition has been verified as meeting Social 
Security's criteria for receiving disability benefits under the 
Disability Insurance (DI) program, remains disabled, i.e. health does 
not Improve, small amounts of wage income are allowable. In 1971, 
the maximum amount of "substantial gainful employment" allowable was 
$140/month. 
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Displacement effects are defined as substitution among alternative 
time allocation resulting from a change in the marginal productivity 
of time. 
work in a self-employed business or on a family farm that generates self-
employed income rather than wage income. Asset income from stocks» bonds, 
and other financial instruments is also unaffected by the benefit 
penalty rate. Lastly, household production can increase the real 
income of a family, especially one which has a disabled head where 
the head may have low, but positive, marginal productivity in the 
household. The reduction of the head's productivity in market labor 
or self-employment due to disability may lower his wage in absolute 
terms, as well as relative, to that of his spouse. This gives him a 
comparative advantage in work in the home and the spouse comparative 
advantage in the labor market for a wage. The options for substitution 
of time are expanded even more if self-employment is available. 
Individuals allocate time among leisure, household production, 
work in the market for a wage, and self-employment. Empirical 
evidence of the income and displacement effects of disability on 
each of the alternative time uses of the head and spouse is needed. 
Research Objectives 
The objectives of this study are: (1) to develop a general model 
of intrafamilial time allocation when the head of the household is 
disabled, and (2) to fit an empirical specification of the above model 
to a micro data set obtained from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics. 
The time allocations of the disabled head of the household and 
spouse are included in the analysis. Important contributions are the 
12 
inclusion of household production and self-employment activities, 
in addition to the traditional work-leisure decision of labor supply. 
The alternative of self-employment has been a known, and often chosen, 
time use for income generation by individuals and families receiving 
disability benefits, but the substitution by these workers of self-
employment activities for labor activities is a previously uninvestigated 
area. 
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CHAPTER II. THE THEORETICAL MODEL 
The model of the productive household allows time to be allocated 
by head and spouse among four activities. The household uses purchased 
inputs and time of the head and spouse to produce output consumed by 
household members. Output of the household production function Is 
referred to as home goods. Additionally, the time of the head and 
spouse are combined with purchased Inputs to produce output that is 
sold In the market. The sale of output produced In the family business 
generates self-employment net Income. The head and spouse can allocate 
time to the labor market for a wage. Time allocated to the market for 
a wage generates "earned Income." Leisure time of the head and spouse 
can be combined with goods to produce utility. No specific functional 
form is assumed for the production of household and business output. 
The emphasis is on human time allocation. 
The Mathematical Model 
The household is assumed to maximize utility subject to four 
constraints. The household production function and the business pro­
duction function constrain the conversion of Inputs into output. 
The total amount of time available to head and spouse constrains the 
allocation of time among activities. Money income constrains the 
purchase of market goods. The household unit in this model is assumed 
to be a family. To simplify the analysis, only the time allocations 
14 
of the head and spouse are considered and the possibility of joint 
production is not considered. 
Objective function and constraints 
Household satisfaction or utility is assumed to be a function of 
a composite good (Y) and leisure time of the household head and spouse^ 
2 
and respectively): 
U = UCY.T^^.Tg^), (1) 
U' > 0, 
U" < 0. 
Home goods can be produced by combining individuals' household produc­
tion time (T^y and for head and spouse) with purchased goods (X^). 
^H ^(^1H'^2H**H)' (2) 
f > 0, 
f" < 0. 
^Only the time allocations of the head and spouse are incorporated 
into the model. 
2 
It is generally accepted that a family utility function can be 
assumed to exist if, as related by Nerlove (1974), the conditions of 
the Samuelson finesse are met: 
... if within the family there can be assumed to take place 
an optimal reallocation of income so as to keep each member's 
dollar expenditure of equal ethical worth, then there can 
be derived for the whole family a set of well-behaved 
indifference contours relating the totals of what It con­
sumes; the family can be said to act as if it maximizes 
such a group preference function. (Samuelson, 1956, p. 21) 
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Market produced goods (Y^) and home produced goods (Y^) are perfect 
substitutes. The composite good Is Indistinguishable between sources: 
Y = Y^ + Y^. (3) 
The production function of the family business combines household 
members' time (T^g for head and T^g for spouse) with purchased goods 
to be sold for Income. 
Yz ~ gCTj^gjTggjXg) , (4) 
g' > 0, 
g" <0. 
Time allocations of the household head and spouse are divided Into 
four productive activities: leisure produces utility, self-employment 
and market labor generate money Income, and home labor produces home 
goods. These alternative time allocations are denoted as: 
Tj^ = market labor for a wage, (5) 
1 = 1, 2 (head and spouse). 
T^^, T^jj, and T^g are defined above. The total time constraint of each 
household member is: 
^1 = ^ iM "^IL ^IH ^IS* (G) 
1 = 1, 2 (head and spouse). 
Leisure is not synonymous with household time. Household labor 
is an input Into the production of home goods. Leisure is an argument 
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in the utility function. Family members may receive satisfaction 
from time allocated to activities other than leisure, but such psychic 
income is ignored by this model. 
Money income is defined below. The left-hand side of the equation 
Indicates sources and the right-hand side indicates expenditures. 
Vz + % + VZM - % -
where 
= money Income, 
V = Income from sources other than market labor or self-employed 
labor, 
PgYg = price of good produced by the family business (P^) times 
total output of the family business (Y^), 
= market wage rate of the head of the household, 
Wg = market wage rate of the spouse, 
PgXg = price of inputs (Pg) times quantity of inputs (Xg) for 
production in the family business, 
PY = price of composite good purchased times the quantity of 
the composite good. 
However, the household has additional resources not reflected in the 
money Income equation. Full Income (1^) is defined to Include all 
resources of the household that can be spent on household consumption 
either directly or Indirectly, i.e. either on goods appearing in the 
17 
utility function directly or on inputs to produce goods appearing in 
the utility function. From the time constraint: 
^IM ^  ~ ^ IH " ^iS (8) 
then, by substitution, the full Income constraint becomes: 
Ip = V + + WjTj + - PgXg - - WjTjs. (9) 
= PY + ^2H^* 
Equation (9) is the receipt side followed by the expenditure side given 
by equation (10). 
Of interest for this study are families with a disabled head. 
Therefore, the Disability Insurance (DI) rate structure, given by 
equation (11)-(16), must also be included in the model. The algebraic 
relationship between income, earnings, and the amount of the subsidy is: 
I = e + B - 0.5[e^ - $1,680] - [e^ - $2,880] (11) 
$1,680 < e^ < $2,880 (12) 
@2 > $2,880 (13) 
I > e (14) 
S = B - 0.5[ei - $1,680] - [e^ - $2,880] (15) 
S > 0 (16) 
where 
B = base benefit level, 
e = earnings level = , 
I = earnings + benefits. 
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S = amount of the subsidy, 
1 = 1  f o r  h o u s e h o l d  h e a d ,  
= 2 for spouse. 
If the disabled head is able to earn, in the labor market, more 
than $140.00 a month ($1,680 a year), he fails the disability test. The 
"test" is defined in tems of whether a person is "unable to engage in 
any substantial gainful activity by reason of a medically determined 
3 
physical or mental impairment." In borderline cases, the definition is 
in terms of "whether the impairment will keep the individual from 
being able to perform any substantial gainful activity for at least 12 
months."^ If the head of the household qualifies for Disability 
Insurance payments, the spouse and dependent children may qualify if 
they do not violate an additional earnings test. Each dependent could, 
in 1971, earn up to $1,680 a year without a reduction in benefits. 
For additional earnings between $1,680 and $2,880, they each would 
lose 50 cents in benefits for each dollar of earnings up to the break 
even point of $3,960 a year. For earnings per person greater than 
$3,960, the dependent is not receiving benefits (Myers, 1975, pp. 74, 114). 
In the model developed here income to dependents other than the spouse 
are included in the contributory income (V^). The model of time 
^Social Security Act, Sections 216(1)(1), 223(d)(2)(A); Code of 
Federal Regulations, Title 20, Part 404.1502, pp. 340-41. 
^Ibid. 
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allocation is for head and spouse and their benefit levels are Included 
In the specification of that model. Additionally, the presence of a 
marginal tax on income is Included in the theoretical model. Therefore, 
the money Income equation becomes: 
i; = V(l-tj) + + W - PgXs -
- - PgXg} + S, (17) 
= V(l-tj) + + (l-t„)W2l2H + (l-tiHP^Yj - PgXg) + S, (18) 
- VM + VH- (19) 
- [,+ t., (20) 
where 
tj = Income tax rate of head and spouse, 
tg = marginal social security tax rate of head and spouse, 
t - tax rate of head and spouse including social security tax 
rate plus Income tax rate. 
Once again, substitute for and rearrange to obtain the full 
Income constraint altered by the Inclusion of marginal tax rates and 
the structure of Disability Insurance benefits: 
I- - V(l-tj) + (l-t,)WiTi + (l-t^jH^Tj + (l-ti)(P2Ï2 - PgXs) 
- (l-'o>VlS - "-'o'V2S' «1) 
= Vm + % + (l-VlC'lL + ^ IH) + + ^2H>- «« 
The household maximizes its utility function subject to the income 
and production constraints. The maximization procedure yields a set 
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of first-order conditions which can be solved for the quantities (of 
inputs) demanded by the household of household labor, self-employed 
time, and leisure, and the quantity supplied by the household to the 
market for a wage. When an interior solution results from the maximiza­
tion procedure, the time allocation equations for the i-th household 
member to the j-th activity where i = 1, 2 (head and spouse), and 
j = M, L, H, S (wage labor, leisure, household and self-employment) 
are a set of simultaneous general reduced form equations ; 
tJ = Tj[W^(l-t^), Wgd-t^), (l-t^)Pg, (l-t^)Pg,P^,Pg, S, V(l-tj), W] (23) 
where 
Y is a parameter reflecting tastes and preferences. 
Comparative Static Results 
This section presents a discussion of the comparative static results 
of the disabled household time allocation model. Use of the Slutsky rela­
tion permits identification of the total effect of the four time alloca­
tions; supply of labor for a wage, demand for leisure time, demand for 
household productive time, and demand for time in self-employment. Sub­
stitution between these total effects is termed, by Evenson (1978), the 
displacement effect. Of additional interest is the income effect and 
income elasticity of demand. The own- and cross-wage elasticities and 
income elasticities will be used to test directional and quantitative 
hypotheses of the effects of disability on Intrafamillal time allocation. 
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Table 2.1 and Slutsky relations given by equations (24) and (25) 
provide the theoretical identification of income and wage effects of 
interest in this study. Directional relationships identified in Table 2.1 
are based on economic theory and existing empirical results. Interpreta­
tion of the own- and cross-wage effects are in terms of the changes in 
alternative time uses due to a change in the shadow price of time. 
For example, the own-wage effect of the head of the household 
indicates that a decrease in the wage rate of the head is expected to 
reduce the number of hours he allocates to the labor market and increase 
hours of self-employment and leisure. The hypothesized change in hours 
allocated by the head to household production due to a reduction in his 
marginal productivity is uncertain. The hypothesized cross-wage effects 
of the head's reduced marginal productivity—reduced wage rate—on the 
time allocations of the spouse indicate an expected increase in hours of 
work in the labor market and a reduction in leisure time of the spouse. 
The cross-wage effect of the head on the spouse's time in self-employment 
and household production is uncertain. 
The general form of the Slutsky relation may be written; 
Own-wage effects Cross-wage effects 
for demand 
j 9^ M 
j f z 
for supply 
z 3V 
s 
(25) 
Table 2.1. Expected signs for Income and wage effects of intrafamlllal time allocation of 
head of household and spouse 
Exogenous 
variables 
w^ 
T ime alloca tion of he ad Ti me allocat ion of spo use 
3T_ 3T 3T_ 
—4 < 0 
3w 
^ < 0  
3w 3 - 3 '  3 -
3T„ 
3w2 ' 
3T_ 
^ > 0  
3w 3 '  3 - 3 "  
4  
3T„ 3T 
^ -
31, i f -
< 3Vi • 
3T„ 3T 3t 
^ > 0  
BTU 
^ < 0  
4-
%<. 
®Where Vg = Vg(l-t), 
Vi = VjCl-t), 
w = wfl-t), 
1 = head, 
2 = spouse. 
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where 
w^ = (l-t^)W^, 
s = S, I (self-employed Income and asset income from financial 
investments, respectively), 
z,j = M, S, H, L (market, self-employed, household, leisure time 
usa, respectively). 
Empirical specification of these relationships allows both directional 
and quantifiable results from which to evaluate the effects of wage and 
income variables on time allocation of households where the head is 
disabled. 
This portion of the chapter has developed a mathematical model 
of Intrafamllial time allocation of a household with a disabled head. 
The remaining portion of the chapter presents a graphical model of 
time allocation for single and two person households. The general 
model of the two person household has also been altered for use in 
the modeling of the effect of disability on household time allocation. 
The Graphical Model 
The graphical presentation that follows is based on that of Evenson 
(1978). The single person household case will be discussed first. 
Single person household 
Figure 2.1 is the basic single person model. Figure 2.2 adds 
the option of self-employment. The composite good is measured on the 
vertical axis. Leisure time is measured on the horizontal axis. 
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Y 
0 H M L 
LEISURE 
Figure 2.1. Time allocation of the head of household 
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I 
L' 0 II 1 » '  
LEISURE 
Figure 2.2. Time allocation of the spouse 
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The point H Indicates the maximum amount of leisure possible. The 
curve abc Is the home production function. As with any short-run 
production function, there Is a fixed amount of goods (Inputs) with 
which home production time Is combined to produce home goods. The 
home production curve Implies that the most productive tasks are 
undertaken first. The slope at any point measures the marginal 
productivity of household time. The shape of the curve indicates 
diminishing marginal productivity in the household. 
The line segment bd expands the consumption opportunity set when 
the option of market work for a wage exists in addition to home pro­
duction. This line segment is located as a tangency at the point where 
marginal productivity in home and market are just equal, point b. To 
the left, productivity in the market exceeds that in the home. In 
Figure 2.1, if the equilibrium position as given by the tangency 
between the opportunity set and an indifference curve is on bd, this 
individual will take OL units of leisure, LM units of work time for 
a wage, and MH units of time in household production. 
In Figure 2.2, the household has access to land or capital 
resources that expand the opportunity set through the option of self-
employment in a farm or business enterprise. Now ac is the home 
production curve and ab' be' reflect the combined production set of home 
and business. Here line segment bd' Indicates the expanded opportunity 
set due to the option of time in the market for a wage. If the Initial 
equilibrium is with indifference curve I, the household member will 
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allocate OL units of time to leisure, LM units of time to the labor 
market, MB units of time to self-employment, and BH units of time to 
home production. The marginal productivity of labor, business and 
home time are equal so point B' on curve aa is where the slope of ac 
is equal to the slope of bd'. Also in Figure 2.2, if the wage rate 
increases, the point at which the line segment is tangent to the home 
product curve moves to the right. Line segment b'd", compared to bd', 
reflects the higher wage faced by the individual. The point of 
tangency moves to the right from b to b' . The effect of an increase 
in the wage rate can be separated into two parts: (1) the conventional 
income and substitution effects on leisure—which in this example 
result in a decrease in leisure from OL to OL' because the substitution 
effect outweighs the income effect for this example, and (2) the 
displacement effect against both self-employed and home time. Time 
in self-employment is reduced from MB to M*B" units, and time in home 
production is reduced from BH to B"H units. The relative shapes of 
the household production curve and the shape of the combined curves 
determine the relative "displacement" effects against home production 
and self-employment time. 
Joint time allocation 
Figures 2.3 and 2.4 are for a two member household. Figure 2.3 
is joint time allocation without self ^-employment. Figure 2.4 is with 
the option of self-employment by one or both household members. For 
Figure 2.3, it is assumed that each individual has a set of curves 
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M, H 0 M* M. 
LEISURE 
Figure 2.3. Joint time allocation, without 
self-employment 
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M* 0 M, H M, 
LEISURE 
Figure 2.4. Joint time allocation, with 
self-employment 
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similar to Figure 2.1. The usual assumption is that the spouse's home 
product curve rises more rapidly than does that of the head—assuming 
greater productivity for the spouse in the household. Additionally, 
the wage rate faced by the head would be greater than that faced by 
the spouse. In this study, a household with a disabled head may not 
follow this usual pattern because of the additional constraint— 
disability. One of the effects of disability to be investigated is 
displacement of the disabled head from market to home time use. The 
spouse may well face a higher wage than does the disabled head. 
However, owing to the greater ease in understanding the workings of 
the model in terms of the traditional orientation, that simpler model 
will be presented here. 
In Figure 2.3, the individuals' curves from Figure 2.1 have been 
summed with the average of the curves represented by abed. The 
vertical axis measures goods per member and the horizontal axis measures 
leisure per household member. This aggregation assumes that the time 
allocations and productivities of the individual household members are 
independent. Along segment ah, both household members are in household 
production only. Along segment be, the head is in the labor market 
and the spouse is in home production. Segment cb is curved due to 
diminishing marginal productivity of the time each individual spends 
in household production. Along segment cd both household members are 
in the labor market for a wage. The slope of cd is the average of 
their individual wage rates. 
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If labor specialization between Individuals within an activity 
(other than leisure which is not directly substitutable) is possible, 
the opportunity set of the household can be expanded. The alternative 
curve abefg assumes there can be gains from specialization due to 
comparative advantage if, for example, the spouse is more productive 
in the home while the head faces a greater wage in the market. Once 
again, if equilibrium is established on segment a2>, both household 
members are engaged only in household production. If the equilibrium 
position is on segment be, only the head is in the labor market with 
the spouse allocating time between leisure and household production. 
Line segment te is a straight line where its horizontal length, , 
is equal to M^H. The spouse's time fully replaces the head's time in 
household production at point e. Each hour the spouse replaces in 
household production for the head means freeing an hour of the head's 
time for market labor without changes in the head's leisure time. 
If equilibrium occurs on segment ef, the spouse allocates all working 
time to household production and the head works only in the market for 
a wage. Because the spouse works on both the head's and spouse's 
household production curves, the spouse experiences diminishing marginal 
returns at a much slower rate. The spouse will not enter the market 
for work for a wage until some point to the left of —M* in Figure 2.3. 
The more substitutable the spouse's time is for the head's, the greater 
are gains from specialization and the line segment ef is longer. 
Increases in the spouse's wage rate will shift the market labor entry 
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point for the spouse to the right of f. Such a shift will reduce gains 
from specializations to the point where all gains have been exhausted 
when both household members face the same real wage rate. 
Figure 2.4 is derived as was Figure 2.3 but now self-employment 
is included as a productive activity. If the head's time is more 
productive in self-employment than is the spouse's time in all time 
allocations, specialization occurs initially to the left of point H. 
The spouse begins to replace the time of the head in household produc­
tion. The time replacement need not be complete. If equilibrium 
occurs on segment ae, the spouse will engage solely in household 
production and the head will allocate time to both self-employment and 
household production. Segment ef is a straight line with a slope 
equal to the wage rate the head faces in the labor market. Since it 
is assumed here that the head's and spouse's time uses are not perfectly 
substitutable, segment ef is not as long horizontally as because 
the spouse's time is not as productive in self-employment and cannot 
fully replace the head's time in self-employment time. Along segment 
ef, the spouse allocates time to business and household labor while the 
head allocates time to labor for a wage, self-employment and household 
production. Line segment is curved because the spouse's time is 
allocated to household production as well as self-employment and is 
substituted only partially for the head's self-employment time. At 
point g the spouse enters the labor market. Once again, increases in 
the spouse's wage shift the tangency position to the right. Such 
shifts reduce gains from specialization as point 9 shifts down ah. 
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Effects on Time Allocation of Changes 
in Exogenous Variables 
Equilibrium position is determined by the tangency of an indiffer­
ence curve with the consumption opportunity set. The effects of changes 
in each of the exogenous variables—nonwage income, wage rates, tax 
rates, and productivity on time allocation—are examined here. 
Nonwage income 
An increase (a decrease) in nonwage Income shifts the combined 
household production and family-owned business production curve up 
(down) vertically parallel to the original curve. Productivity in any 
time use is unaffected by nonwage income; therefore, the slopes are 
unaffected at each unit of time. If the initial equilibrium is on a 
linear segment and the final equilibrium is also on a linear segment, 
then only an income effect occurs. When the initial equilibrium is 
on a curved segment, there are both income and substitution effects of 
a change in nonwage income. If the initial equilibrium is on a linear 
segment with the final equilibrium on a curved segment of the opportunity 
set, there are both income and substitution effects. 
Head's labor wage 
An increase (a decrease) in the head's market wage will have both 
income and substitution effects if the initial equilibrium is such that 
the head is more productive in self-employment than the spouse and is 
also engaged in the labor market for a wage, i.e. tangency on segment 
fg. There the spouse is on the head's and spouse's combined home 
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product and family business curves. An increase (a decrease) in the 
wage of the business manager will alter the shape of the combined curve 
aefgh shown in Figure 2.4. The point of entry into the labor market 
by the operator shifts to the right (left) of e. The slope of the 
opportunity set's boundary is rotated upward (downward) from this 
point. This shift increases (decreases) the likelihood that the 
business manager-head is in the market after the wage increases 
(decreases). This increase (decrease) in labor time is accompanied 
by a decrease (increase) in total time in business and household produc­
tion. If the initial equilibrium is on segment ef where the operator 
is in the labor market and the substitution effect dominates, the 
operator will allocate more (less) time to market labor, causing the 
other household member to increase (decrease) replacement of the family 
business manager's time in household and family business activities. 
If the income effect dominates and leisure is a norma:l good, consumption 
of leisure by both household members will increase (decrease). House­
hold and business time by the manager of the latter is reduced 
(increased) and direction of change of market time depends upon the 
extent of the rightward (leftward) shift on the entry point into 
the market and location of the final equilibrium. 
Spouse's market wage 
An increase (decrease) in the spouse's market wage shifts point 
g, the point of market entry by the spouse, to the right (left) of g 
and rotates segment gf upward (downward). If the equilibrium position 
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is on segment ag where the spouse is not working in the market, there 
is no effect on either the spouse's or business manager's time alloca^ 
tions. However, the wage increase (decrease) could be great enough to 
shift the spouse into the market, as a result of the rightward 
shift in point g. The displacement of self-employed business time 
and household time by the spouse would occur. If the spouse is in 
the labor market at the time of the wage increase (decrease), the 
relative strengths of the income and substitution effects would deter­
mine the reallocation of time to activities by household members. 
If the substitution effect dominates, the manager should increase 
(decrease) market time. The spouse will reduce (increase) replacement 
in business and household labor with a resulting increase (decrease) 
in market work by head and spouse. If the income effect dominates, 
leisure of both the self-employed head and spouse will increase 
(decrease). There is a reduction in market time while business and 
household labor remain unaffected. Changes in the spouse's time 
allocation are uncertain. With an Increase (decrease) in the spouse's 
wage and the resulting shift of g rightward (leftward), the directional 
change in the spouse's market time depends on the curvature of segment 
ef. However, if market time is unchanged, the increase (decrease) in 
leisure comes from reduced (increased) household and business labor. 
If market time decreases (increases), leisure time increases (decreases) 
while market, household and business time decrease (increase). A 
large decrease (increase) in household and business time as a result 
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of the rightward (leftward) shift in point g could increase (decrease) 
both leisure and market time due to the large reduction (increase) 
in household and business time. Time allocation adjustments of the 
family depend upon the wage rate increase (decrease), curvature of 
the combined product curve, and position of the final equilibrium. 
Spouse's household productivity 
An increase (a decrease) in the productivity of the spouse's 
time in household production rotates the boundary of the opportunity 
set upward (downward) about point a. There are income and substitution 
effects due to the increased (decreased) curvature of the household 
production curve at each quantity of time. The increased (decreased) 
productivity causes the point of entry of the spouse into the market 
to shift to the left (right) along ah. Therefore, if the spouse's 
market wage is constant, but household productivity increases (decreases), 
the spouse is less (more) likely to work in the market. If leisure is 
a normal good, an increase (a decrease) in spouse's leisure time and 
a decrease (an increase) in market work time would accompany the 
increase (decrease) in household production. 
Self-employment productivity 
An increase (a decrease) in productivity of the manager of the family-
owned and operated business rotates the opportunity set's boundary upward 
(downward) about a. Additionally, point e shifts leftward (rightward) on 
ah and it is less (more) likely that the manager engages in market work. 
However, if he or she does, a displacement effect occurs, reducing 
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(increasing) market hours and increasing (decreasing) time in business 
production by the manager of the family business. 
If the spouse faces a higher market wage than the business 
manager-head, the spouse enters the labor market at e rather than the 
head. If the equilibrium position occurs above e, the manager will 
begin to replace the spouse's time in household and business activities. 
Marginal tax rate 
The addition of a marginal tax rate to the model is treated as a 
reduction in the real return to the economic agent in that time alloca­
tion. In the case of an income tax, the return to household production 
would be unaffected. The wage rate is reduced. If the hourly wage, pre­
tax, is W, the post-tax hourly return to labor is W(l-t) where t is the 
marginal tax rate. The line segment indicating the option of labor 
market time and the self-employment segment rotates downward as with a 
decrease in the wage rate from a pre-tax slope of W to the post-tax 
slope of W(l-t). Any increase (decrease) in an existing tax rate would 
reduce (increase) W(l-t) as indicated by the slope of the line segment eg 
in Figures 2.1 and 2.2, for example. The inclusion of a marginal tax 
rate is not discussed by Evenson (1978), but is added here for the 
purpose of adapting the household production model to this study. 
Application of the Household Production Model 
The application of the household production model to the analysis 
of the economic effects of disability on intrafamilial time allocation 
requires two changes in the shape of the consumption opportunity set. 
For the totally or partially disabled household which allocates no time 
to market work for a wage, the model is as that in Figure 2.3 with aefg 
as the combined curves. The head will not enter the market if his 
disability is severe enough. If he has been granted disability entitle­
ment, the head will receive disability benefits. It can be assumed 
that the additional constraint of "disability" places a physical barrier 
to labor market participation. Disability benefits are nonwage income 
of the family. The benefit payment to the disabled head assumes that 
the disability constraint is binding with hours in the market for a 
wage equal to zero. If the disabled head is able to earn, in the labor 
market, more than $140.00 a month ($1,680 a year) he fails the disability 
test. The "test" is defined in terms of whether a person is "unable 
to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of a medically 
determined physical or mental impairment." In borderline cases, the 
definition is in terms of "whether the impairment will keep the 
individual from being able to perform any substantial gainful activity 
for at least 12 months." If the head of the household qualifies for 
Disability Insurance payments, the spouse and dependent children may 
qualify if they do not violate an additional earnings test. Each 
dependent could, in 1971, earn up to $1,680 a year without a reduction 
in benefits. For additional earnings between $1,680 and $2,880, they 
each would lose 50 cents in benefits for each dollar of earnings. 
For earnings greater than $2,880, dollar for dollar reduction in 
benefits make earnings of $3,960 the break-even point. Past that 
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point, the dependent is not receiving benefits. In the model developed 
here, income to dependents other than the spouse are included in 
contributory income. If the disability constraint is not binding 
and there is a positive amount of time allocated to labor for a wage, 
the value of the benefit payment is zero.^ This affects the position 
and curvature of the consumption opportunity set. Additionally, the 
shape of the opportunity set is altered if the spouse is eligible, 
due to dependent children in the household, for benefit payments. 
How much the opportunity set shifts up or down depends on the point 
of tangency between the indifference curve and line segment ef. An 
equilibrium position on ef means the spouse works for a wage. How far 
to the left or right the equilibrium occurs on ef determines how far 
down or up, respectively, the opportunity set shifts. This is because 
benefit payments are a source of nonwage income. Therefore, a 
simultaneous solution to time allocation is assumed. 
Figure 2.5 illustrates the total income-earnings frontier for 
the spouse. (Children would also receive benefits, but their time 
allocations are not considered here and the benefits they receive will 
be reflected in nonwage income of the family.) The spouse could, 
in 1971, earn up to $1,680 a year without a reduction in benefits. 
For additional earnings between $1,680 and $2,880, the spouse loses 
50 cents in benefits for each dollar earned. For additional earnings, 
the spouse loses a dollar of benefits for every dollar of earnings 
^See Appendix A for specific information regarding current Social 
Security Regulations and those in force in 1971. 
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0 EARNINGS $1,680 $2,880 $3,960 
Figure 2.5. Income-earnings frontier for spouse receiving 
Social Security Disability Insurance benefits 
in 1971 
] 
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up to the break-even point of $3,960. For earnings greater than $3,960, 
the spouse Is not receiving benefits. In Figure 2.5, with total Income 
on the vertical axis and earnings on the horizontal axis, the ray drawn 
at a 45 degree angle, OE, Indicates earnings equal to total Income In 
the absence of benefits. The line ÂBCD Is the upper limit of benefit 
payment plus earnings achievable at each earnings level, given the 
structure of the subsidy. The area bounded by Â6HI Is the amount of 
subsidy or benefits payments that can be received if maximum benefits 
are received. This area is equal to the area bounded by ÀBCD6. At 
each earnings level, earnings plus subsidy equal Income. 
The existence and degree of disability of the household head 
will affect the household head's productivity in one or more of the 
time allocations studied here. The purpose of this study is to 
empirically test how disability of the head affects time allocation 
between head and spouse, and the reallocation of each household member's 
time among activities. The strength and direction of the effects 
depend on the equilibrium position on the consumption opportunity set. 
They depend on the shape of the family's combined business and household 
product curve and the relative productiveness of each household member 
in each alternative time use. 
The life-cycle and intertemporal adjustments to disability 
The cross-sectional model described above includes in the environ­
mental parameter, ages of the head and spouse, age of the youngest 
child, and number of children as indications of the stage in the family 
life-cycle during which the disability exists. The incidence of 
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disability increases with age since disability may be due to disease 
or the aging process in addition to occupational injury. Adjustment to 
disability may vary with age, i.e., stage in the life-cycle. If the 
head of the household is nearing retirement and the spouse has no work 
history, the fixed costs of entering the labor market may be greater 
than any forseeable mandatory gains. Costs of employment can include 
the cost of training, transportation, clothing, and child care. In 
such later life-cycle cases there is an incentive to rely on DI 
benefits and other unearned income. In this same period of the family 
life-cycle a moderate to long work history of the head and/or spouse 
before the incidence of disability can result in net worth of the family 
being large enough to moderate the effects of low transitory income 
during disability. 
For a family in an early stage of the life-cycle, the net benefits 
of the spouse entering the job market may depend on the number and ages 
of the children. If the family is childless, i.e., in the initial 
stage of the family life-cycle, the cost of child care is zero and 
family DI benefits are not a possibility. Therefore, the opportunity 
cost of the spouse's employment is her dependent benefits. During an 
early, but later, stage of the family life-cycle, i.e., when the family 
contains pre-school or infant children, eligibility for family DI 
benefits may mean an income level greater than possible net earnings. 
For families with older children, the family DI benefit alternative 
is still attractive, but little or no child care costs increase the 
opportunity cost measured by net earnings. In the cross-sectional 
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model, the number of years the head has been disabled controls to some 
extent for the permanent as opposed to transitory nature of income 
during a temporary or extended period of disability. 
In an intertemporal model, not provided by this study, the longitudi­
nal aspects of the adjustment process can be investigated. The life-
cycle aspects of adjustment would be proxied by variables measured 
during two or more time periods. There could be dissavings (borrowing) 
during periods in which the individual is disabled. Demand functions 
would depend upon existing wealth levels, expected future income, the 
interest rate and time preference. In an intertemporal model, age 
would be important because older disabled heads of households would 
have fewer earning years to repay loans. Additionally, regarding 
borrowing, duration of the disability becomes important in the adjust­
ment process. 
The mathematical and graphical models presented in this chapter 
have been of a theoretical nature. The empirical measures of the 
variables identified by this model and the specification of the model 
will be presented in the following chapters. 
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CHAPTER III. THE EMPIRICAL MODEL: DATA SET AND 
EMPIRICAL MEASUREMENT OF THE VARIABLES 
A theoretical model of resource allocation in a household with a 
disabled head has been presented in Chapter II. Equation (23) gives 
the general reduced form demand and supply functions for the household 
head and spouse. These functions are demand for leisure, demand for 
household production time, demand for time in the family business or 
self-employment, and supply of labor to the market for a wage. The 
endogenous variables are functions of all exogenous variables in the 
system. This chapter provides a discussion of the empirical model, 
the data set,and the operational definition of the variables. 
The Data Set 
The data set used in the empirical analysis is the Panel Study of 
Income Dynamics.^ The study's design is longitudinal and interviews 
2 have been taken once each spring since 1968. However, the use of the 
data for this study is in terms of cross-sectional analysis using the 
^A Panel Study of Income Dynamics, conducted under contract to 
the Office of Economic Opportunity by the Survey Research Center (SRC): 
Institute for Social Research (ISR) 
University of Michigan 
Ann Arbor, Michigan 
2 
The data tape from which the samples used in this study were 
drawn is the nine-year tape, 1968-1976. 
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fifth year, 1972. Economic variables are reported for the year 1971. 
The original Survey Research Center (SRC) sample consisted of a cross-
section of dwellings of the coterminous United States and a subsample 
of families previously Interviewed in the spring of 1966 by the Bureau 
o 
of the Census for the Office of Economic Opportunity. Since then, it 
has consisted of all panel members living in families that were inter­
viewed the previous year and newly-formed families containing any 
adult panel member who had moved since 1968 from a sample family. The 
respondent is usually the head of the household. In a married house­
hold with spouse present, the husband is the head by definition. The 
total number of families in the sample after the 1972 interviewing wave 
was 5,060. The weighted sample is representative of the population of 
the United States (Institute for Social Research, 1972a, p. 33).^ 
3 
In the first year of the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, 1968, 
respondents came from two combined samples. The first Included approxi­
mately 1,900 low Income households (predominantly Black) originally 
sampled and interviewed in 1966 and 1967 by the United States Census 
Bureau for the Office of Economic Opportunity. The second was a cross 
section of about 3,000 households drawn from the Survey Research Center's 
master sampling frame. The Intent was to achieve representativeness of 
the population of the coterminous United States. Both samples experienced 
nonresponse in 1968. Therefore, the Survey Research Center (SRC) has 
Included In the data set the option to disproportionately weight the 
cases to correct numerically for losses from nonresponse in the 1968 
Interview year. 
» 
^Unfortunately, weighting of the sample is accomplished by multi­
plying the responses of existing respondents by what is essentially 
the inverse of the probability of being selected into the sample. 
While this method has been widely used it has a significant limitation: 
no new information is Introduced—the variation among cases is unchanged. 
The relationships which exist are amplified, but no new, alternative 
relationships are Introduced by this form of correction for nonrandom-
ness. Therefore, the analysis reported here is based on unweighted 
responses. 
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The Samples 
Estimation of the empirical model requires three samples be used. 
Each includes only households with the same head and, if appropriate, 
wife for 1971 and 1972 and excludes any newly-formed families after the 
1972 year.^ This is necessary because time use and income variables 
were asked of the household in 1972, but refer to 1971. Several addi­
tional variables necessary to estimate the marginal productivity of 
time (in Chapter IV) and to correctly specify the time allocation 
equations (in Chapter V) are measured and reported in the 1971 interview 
year. 
The first sample is used to estimate self-employed income for all 
respondents reporting income of such a nature. A second sample of 
households where both a household head and spouse are present is used 
to estimate the wage rate to be used as the shadow price of time for 
individuals not currently employed in the labor market, the probability 
of being in the labor market for a wage, and the probability of being 
disabled. 
5 
Newly-formed families have information regarding their original 
panel family as historical data for years before they split off. To 
include these newly-formed families gives multiple counts to families 
with split-offs occurring in more recent years than the year of 
Interest. Excluding these split-offs causes no major problems with 
the representativeness of the sample. 
A visual comparison of percentage distributions of selected demo­
graphic variables between samples seems to indicate random selection 
into the sample to be used. Of course, generalizations of findings to 
households having experienced a change in head or wife in the previous 
year should be avoided. 
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The third sample Is drawn from the data set based on three 
eligibility criteria. (1) The household consists of two major adults 
living as and assuming the roles of head and spouse. (2) The maximum 
age of the head is 64 years. And, (3) a positive response, indicating 
disability, given by the head of the household to the question: Do 
you have a physical or nervous condition that limits the type of work, 
or the amount of work, you can do? This latter sample is used to 
estimate the time allocation equations for head and spouse when the head 
of the household is disabled. 
Variables 
Productive time allocations for the head of the household and for 
the spouse are divided into four exclusive activities. Hours of work 
for money income is subdivided into hours in the labor market and hours 
in self-employment. Household production hours and hours of leisure 
are the nonmarket time allocations. 
Annual hours of work for money 
Heads of households in the labor force are asked about weeks per 
year and number of hours per week worked the previous year (1971). 
Annual hours worked Includes time spent on the main job and any extra 
jobs. For heads currently retired or students at the time of the 
interview, the number of weeks and hours per week worked is reported 
if they worked the previous year. 
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For the purposes of this study, hours of work for money by the head 
is further identified as allocated to market labor for a wage or self-
employed time. Hours allocated to self-employment were isolated using 
a combination of criteria. The respondents currently employed indicated 
whether they worked for themselves only, for themselves and someone 
else, or for someone else only. Working for themselves and someone 
else usually refers to main employment and extra jobs. Additionally, 
income sources are divided into income from professional practice or 
trade; business income; income from roomers, boarders, or market 
gardening; and income from farming.^ The occupational codes provide 
corresponding categories. Therefore, if the head reports income from 
one of these sources and a corresponding occupation and indicates 
self-employment, time in that occupation is coded as self-employed time. 
In rare instances, the head indicates working only for oneself without 
corresponding income. In these cases, earnings are considered to be 
self-employed income with capital equipment being minimal and income 
generated by the capital stock being zero. 
The annual time of travel to work is included for the head in time 
allocated to market labor or self-employment according to the share of 
time allocated to each work activity. Likewise, annual time of travel 
to work is included for the spouse in time allocated to work outside 
the household. 
^The data report these income sources using bracket codes. The 
exact income amounts were recreated by the researcher in an effort to 
have the best information available regarding self-employed Income. 
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Hours per week and weeks per year of work are reported for the 
spouse. Less detail regarding self-employment is available. For the 
spouse. If either farm or business occupational codes are reported, then 
Income Is assumed to be from self-employment. The data do not discrimi­
nate time allocations for the spouse to allow time to both self-employ-
ment and the labor market for a wage. 
In the final, disabled sample very few women and Black men report 
self-employed time. As a result, a separate time allocation to self-
employment for Black males Is statistically unacceptable. Hours of 
work for money Is the dependent variable for time allocation outside 
the home. A dummy variable Is used to Indicate self-employment. 
Annual household production hours 
Hours of unpaid productive work In the household by the head and 
spouse are measured by this variable. Time allocated by head and spouse 
to car repairs, work for housing, and making additions and repairs to 
the dwelling unit Is reported. Additionally, an Imputation of a dollar 
an hour for each dollar saved by growing or canning food is included 
In this measure. Regrettably, the data set does not separate time alloca­
tions in these activities for head and spouse. Therefore, the time is 
divided in half and allocated to head and spouse, each, without regard 
to who may have generated the production. Variation between head and 
wife regarding this variable comes from the separate Inclusion in 
home production, by each, of time spent in housework and child care. 
The variation among households is a more accurate Interpretation of 
this variable. 
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Annual hours of leisure 
Leisure time is treated as a residual allocation. Leisure is 
defined as 8,760 (365x24) hours less total reported hours of work for 
money, market labor for d wage and self-employment, and time reported 
in household production. Leisure time is calculated separately for 
head and spouse. 
Income sources 
Earnings generated by allocating time to the labor market for a 
wage are obviously a function of hours times the wage rate. As such, 
earnings are, without exception, endogenous to the model and not 
acceptable as an explanatory variable. However, earnings divided by 
hours are used to construct the marginal wage assuming that in equilibrium 
the average wage equals the marginal wage. 
Self-employed Income is also, to a lesser extent, endogenous 
to the model. However, most income generated by self-employment also 
has a capital income component that does not vary directly with hours 
allocated to the activity self-employment. Yet, because of the endo­
genous nature of the variable, an estimation procedure is used to 
assign an estimated amount of self-employed income to households 
reporting Income from professional practice or trade, gardening for 
7 
market, roomers and boarders, a business or a farm. For households 
7 Some households report small amounts of income categorized as 
self-employed (nonearnlngs) yet report no hours of self-employment. 
Usually this Income is reported from roomers wd boarders. These amounts 
are included here, i.e., it is not necessary to report self-employed 
time to have self-employed Income—some may more accurately be Interpreted 
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not reporting self-employed income, the amount remains equal to zero 
g 
even after the estimation procedure. Self-employed income is after­
tax income. Additionally, self-employed income is a net, rather than 
gross, figure. The costs of generating the income is subtracted from 
revenue generated and then taxes are calculated. No special considera­
tion is given to possible tax breaks allowed to corporations and 
proprietorships because no information is available for an exact 
calculation. However, Social Security tax rates and corresponding tax 
amounts are applied to self-employed income. The rates used are 
consistent with those in effect in the 1971 tax year and are discussed 
below. 
Nonwage—contributory—income is received not from current work 
efforts, but those of the past, and as such is assumed to be exogenous 
to a model of current time use. They require some past work effort 
to be eligible and in the case of DI benefits, absence of current work. 
Included are Disability Insurance (DI) payments of Social Security, 
unemployment and workers' compensation payments, and retirement 
benefits from private pensions and annuities. These income sources 
are either tax exempted by law, or in the case of private retirement 
benefits, taxes are ignored. 
as resulting from the sale of home-produced products or services rather 
than consuming them. This is still self-employed income even though 
it does not come from an organized business. 
8 
Appendix B reports the results of the regression equations used 
to estimate self-employed income. 
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Transfer—noncontributory—Income is transfers from either the 
government or friends and relatives. No productive effort.is required 
nor is this considered as compensation for work effort, past or present. 
Income from ADC or AFCD, public noncontributory (welfare) transfers, 
child support, financial help from relatives, and alimony are included. 
All but the latter are tax exempt by law. No taxes are calculated for 
these income sources. However, Included in this source is contributions 
to the family unit by workers other than head or spouse. These workers 
have had both Social Security and income tax calculated for the average 
contribution per person other than head and spouse. 
Asset income from financial instruments and investments is reported. 
Tax amounts are calculated using the federal income tax rate with no 
allowance for capital gains rates. The share of tax allocated to asset 
Income is the same as the share of taxable Income of head and spouse 
reported as asset or interest income. 
Taxes 
Tax rates and the amount of tax payments are especially important 
in this study because the opportunity cost, faced by the disabled, 
of not working is after-tax income (U.S. Department of Treasury, 
1973, 1979). For calculating income tax, the household is assigned 
a tax table based on marital status and whether dependent children 
are reported as exemptions. All married persons are assumed to 
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file jointly. Single persons without dependents are assumed to file 
according to the law as single, but if they reported children they 
were assigned the tax schedule for heads of households. It is 
assumed that persons take the minimum deduction of $1,050 if their 
adjusted gross income is less than $8,000. If their adjusted gross 
income is between $8,000 and $11,500, the standard deduction of 
13 percent is applied. For households with an income greater than 
$11,500, the maximum standard deduction allowed ($1,500) is applied 
if they were not homeovmers. For households with an income greater 
than $11,500 who owned their home, an average deduction for households 
filing with that income and filing status is applied (U.S. Department 
of Treasury, 1973).* 
Exemptions for the head of household are reported in the data. 
An additional deduction is allowed for individuals 65 years of age 
or older. No information was available to allow for an exemption 
due to blindness. Federal tax amounts and tax rates applicable under 
these criteria were assigned. 
Adjusted gross Income is calculated as net self-employed Income, 
asset income, plus earnings of the head and spouse as reported In the 
9 
For each Income group the total amount of deductions claimed 
was divided by the total number of tax filers claiming the deductions. 
The resulting figure is the average deduction for each Income 
group. The averages range from the high teens to the low to mid-208— 
reasonable figures given the 1971 standard deduction is 13 percent. 
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data set. Calculated deductions and reported and calculated exemptions 
are summed and subtracted from adjusted gross income to arrive at 
taxable Income. The appropriate tax table, given the household's 
filing status, is applied and the amount of the tax is calculated. 
The tax rate applicable at the margin^ then becomes the marginal income 
tax rate used to calculate the after-tax wage rate. 
The Social Security tax for 1971 is applied at a different rate 
depending on whether income is generated in the labor market or in self-
employment, or in both. In each case, the maximum taxable income is 
$7,800. The combined—employee and employer—PICA tax rate for labor 
market earnings is 10.4 percent with the maximum PICA tax withheld from 
wages in 1971 being $405.60. While shifting of the tax onto the employee 
is a generally accepted assumption, it is doubtful that the combined 
rate is perceived by employees when facing the opportunity cost of not 
working an additional hour. Therefore, the employee's share, 5.2 
percent, is the appropriate tax rate for this study. In the case of 
self-employment, the SE tax rate is 7.5 percent with the maximum self-
employment tax being $585.00. For persons allocating time to both the 
labor market for a wage and self-employment, the tax is paid first 
from wages. If the maximum taxable earnings limit has not been reached, 
additional tax is paid on self-employed income, at the SE rate, until the 
^'^It is assumed here that for most households, income falls within 
a tax bracket rather than between them. Therefore, a small change in 
hours worked will leave the individual in the same tax bracket and the 
marginal tax rate unchanged. Hence, the marginal tax rate is assumed 
to be exogenous. 
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limit is reached. In this latter case of both kinds of employment 
income, the maximum tax withheld is greater than $405.60 but less than 
$585.00 and depends on the amount of income generated in the labor 
market. If income is zero or greater than $7,800, the Social Security 
tax rate is zero. 
No information regarding state of residence is available and no 
allowance is made for taxes other than the federal income tax and the 
Social Security, PICA and SE, taxes. 
After-tax wage rate 
An estimate of the value of time of head and spouse is necessary 
in an econometric analysis of intrafamilial time allocation. The 
shadow price of an individual's time is an important determinant of 
resource allocation. An hourly wage rate for the head and/or spouse 
reporting market earnings is calculated for each by dividing earnings 
of the head and spouse, respectively, by the number of hours allocated 
by each to the labor market for a wage. The calculated wage rate is 
then multiplied by one minus the sum of the appropriate marginal income 
tax rate and the marginal Social Security tax rate. If the individual 
is employed in both the labor market for a wage and is self-employed, 
the Social Security tax that is applicable at the margin is the one used 
here. While it is recognized that persons who allocate time to the 
labor market for a wage are not subject to the Social Security tax 
rate for the self-employed, it is true that for those who allocate time 
to both the market for a wage and self-employment, the marginal effect 
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of working one more hour must take into account the tax rate that 
applies at the margin. 
Of the 510 two-person households in the disabled sample, 258 heads of 
households and 204 spouses have reported labor market earnings and hours 
in market labor in 1971. Therefore, a shadow price of time or imputed 
wage is estimated for the remaining individuals not reporting labor 
market activity. The procedure and variables used are the subject of 
Chapter IV. 
A summary of variables 
Table 3.1 provides a summary and brief description of all variables 
used in the empirical analysis. Included are some variables not 
previously discussed. 
Chapter IV presents estimates of the wage equations for head and 
spouse. Time allocation equations for head and spouse are presented 
in Chapter V. 
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Table 3.1. Summary of survey variables 
Variables and definitions 
AGE 
ÂGEÀGK 
EDUC 
SMSÂ 
REGION 
DISABLED 
YRSDIS 
HEALIMIT 
EDILIMIT 
TRANSFER 
NONWAGEY 
Age—In years—as proxy for stage in the life-cycle. 
Age squared—measures the marginal effect of age. 
Educational level—an ordinal scale indicating the amount 
of academic and nonacademic formal training. 
Distance from the family's residence to the nearest SMSA— 
measured with an ordinal scale. 
Region of the country where 1971 income was generated— 
dummy variable: 1 = northeast, 
2 = northcentral, 
3 =» south, 
4 = west. 
Disability indicator—identifies heads of households who 
have Indicated they have a physical or nervous condition 
that limits the type or amount of work they can do. 
Years disabled—ordinal variable—measures adjustment time 
since onset of health impairment. 
Health limitation—divides the disabled sample into those 
who indicate a definite health limitation and those who 
indicate that their health status results in a minor 
limitation. 
Education of head times disability indicator—research 
Indicates that while disability reduces productivity, 
education, in Increasing amounts, lessens the reduction due 
to greater ability to substitute mental work for physical 
work. 
Noncontributory nonwage Income—Includes transfer Income 
from governmental sources, family, and friends. 
Contributory nonwage income—includes Social Security 
payments, unemployment and workers' compensation, private 
pensions, and annuity payments. 
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Table 3.1. (continued) 
Variables and definitions 
Vg - T^ . 
Vj. - T* 
Estimated after-tax self-employed income of head and 
spouse. 
Âfter-tax asset income from financial instruments and 
investments. 
NUMROOMS Number of rooms in the household's dwelling unit—a proxy 
for amount of housework. 
OCCUP 
In W(l-t) 
t = to+So 
A6ECHILD 
NUMCHILD 
NUMHHMEM 
UEMPRATE 
Set of dummy variables indicating broad occupational 
categories for head and spouse: 
0 = retired, student or housespouse, 
1 = professional or trade, 
2 = manager or official, 
3 =, businessperson, 
4 = sales or clerical, 
5 = craftsperson, 
6 = operator, 
7 = unskilled labor or service worker, 
8 = farmer or farm manager, 
9 = misc. for head; missing for spouse. 
Natural log of the after-tax wage rate—in dollars. 
The sum tax rates applicable at the margin—Social 
Security tax rate (S^) plus income tax rate (t^). 
Age of the youngest child in the household—in years. 
Number of children in the household—age less than 18 
years. 
Number of household members older than 18 years (other than 
head and spouse). 
Unemployment rate in respondent's county where 1971 income 
was generated—controls for involuntary unemployment as a 
measure of demand in the labor market. 
^T = tax amount. Income tax was calculated for all taxable income 
sources. Amount of tax paid on each income source, i.e., asset income 
and self-employed Income, is share of total income tax due on total 
income including tax paid for Social Security self-employed income where 
applicable. 
Table 3.1. (continued) 
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Variables and definitions 
RACE 
WAGEARNR 
SELF 
OTHRAIN . 
NUMMAJA 
PD 
PM 
Tm 
TS 
% 
% 
Race—Black and non-Black. Employment patterns of 
nonwhltes, excluding Blacks, have been shown to be more 
like patterns of Whites than of Blacks. Separate analyses 
are conducted for Black and non-Black populations due to 
the Interaction of race with many of the Independent 
variables. 
Indicates wage earners—Individuals participating in the 
labor market for a wage receive a value of one. 
Individuals reporting time In self-employment receive a 
value of one. 
Indicates whether the head has received training other than 
through the regular school system. 
Divides original sample into households with head and 
spouse and those with head of household only. 
Linear probability of being disabled. See Appendix C for 
variables used in the construction of this measure. 
Linear probability of being in the labor market for a 
wage. See Appendix C for variables used in the 
construction of this measure. 
Annual hours allocated to the labor market for a wage. 
Annual hours allocated to self-employment. 
Annual hours allocated to work outside the home. 
Annual hours allocated to household production. 
Annual hours allocated to leisure. 
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CHAPTER IV. ESTIMATES OF THE WAGE EQUATIONS 
This chapter provides estimates of the wage equations for the head 
of the household and spouse. Since one or both may not have been 
employed as wage earners, an estimation of the shadow price of time— 
the estimated wage rate—is required. Estimates for the unemployed and 
those who choose not to participate in the labor force based on pro­
ductivity of those who are employed in the labor market would Introduce 
selection bias (Heckman, 1974, 1976, 1979, 1980; Olsen, 1980). The 
parameters used to estimate the wage for nonwage earners would be 
upwardly biased (Smith, 1980, pp. 3-23). If, as should be assumed, 
individuals choose other income alternatives than labor in the market 
for a wage because of differential characteristics and preferences 
between wage earners and these other individuals, then the nonrandom 
differences must be accounted for. 
A second potential source of selection bias can be assumed to 
exist in the estimation of the wage rate if the probability of being 
disabled Is not a random occurrence in the population. If the disabled 
and the able-bodied are not homogeneous in other characteristics, the 
disabled might not face the same wage offer as the others, even if 
they were able bodied. 
By taking into account, statistically, the potential nonrandomness 
of disability in the population and differential preferences between 
^The author is grateful to Wallace Huffman for pointing out this 
second potential source of bias. 
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wage earners and others, the whole sample can be used to estimate the 
shadow price of time. As a result, the empirical findings can be 
generalized with confidence because selection of the sample has not 
biased the parameters used to estimate the wage rate. 
Discussion of Selection Bias 
Until recently, the practice in empirical research was to estimate 
labor supply functions based on samples of working individuals only. This 
was done either directly by confining the analysis to labor force partici­
pants or indirectly by imputing a wage to nonworklng persons from a wage 
equation estimated over a sample of workers. This restriction was forced 
by the absence of data on the value of time for nonwage earners. Much of 
the econometric work on labor supply of women during the past eight years 
has dealt with alternative methods of estimating wage and labor supply 
2 functions that are free of this selection or censoring bias. 
To resolve the problem of bias requires an understanding of the 
nature of the decision to participate in the labor force. If one 
2 
The distinction between a truncated sample and a censored sample is 
crucial. In a truncated sample there are no data available on which to 
estimate the probability that an observation belongs to the Included or 
the excluded group. In a censored sample, data exists in the sample for 
included and excluded groups; therefore, the probability of being in one 
or the other group can be estimated from the sample. In this study, the 
sample is censored in both the work/no work decision and whether or not 
the individual is disabled. Therefore, a technique that enables the 
researcher to use the estimated probability to estimate the missing condi­
tional mean for each observation will be used. The estimated conditional 
mean is utilized as a regressor in an ordinary regression analysis so 
that estimators with desirable large sample properties are derived by 
computationally simple methods. 
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estimates a wage equation using a sample of working Individuals, a 
bias results because the same set of variables that determine wages 
enters as a criterion for sample eligibility. The estimated wage 
function confounds the true behavioral wage function with the rules 
for sample inclusion. Smith (1980, p. 20) provides a graphical repre­
sentation of the nature of selection bias (Figure 4.1). In Figure 4.1, 
the true supply function for an individual is the index line. However, 
due to truncation of hours at zero—some individuals choose to not 
participate in the labor force—the expected number of working hours 
per person can be obtained from the expected value locus. According to 
Smith, the expected value locus is the labor supply function given that 
it measures—at each wage—the average amount of work effort per 
person. The OLS labor supply function for workers approximates the 
means of the distributions conditional on a positive number of hours of 
work. As indicated by Smith, the distance between the OLS function 
and the index line measures the extent of selectivity bias at each 
wage. 
Additionally, Smith, as editor of a collection of studies regarding 
female labor supply, summarizes findings which indicate that OLS over-
predicts wages of all women by at least a moderate amount. Empirical 
estimates of the wage using OLS exceed the mean wage offer by from 5.3 
3 percent to 11.1 percent. Since OLS predicts the same wage for women 
^As reported by Smith (1980, p. 16), "In the Individual studies, 
the OLS wage prediction exceeds the mean wage offer by 5.3 percent 
(Cogan, Chapter 7), 5.5 percent (Heckman), 7.8 percent (Cogan, 
Chapter 2), and 11.1 percent (Hanoch)." 
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Figure 4.1. Alternative labor supply functions 
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regardless of whether or not they participate in the labor force, the 
bias becomes even more severe when wages are imputed to nonworking 
women (Smith, 1980). ' Studies by Heckman (1980) and Hanoch (1980) 
indicate that OLS overstates wages for nonpartlcipants by over 20 
percent according to Smith's (1980, p. 17) conclusions. In the same 
volume, Cogan (1980) reports estimates of labor supply functions for 
all women—using an Instrumental wage and OLS regression. The resulting 
wage elasticity exceeds by 25 percent a comparable one calculated by 
Heckman (1980) in which he corrected for selection bias (Smith, 1980, 
p. 18). 
Sample selection bias can exist for two reasons: (1) there may be 
self-selection by the individuals being Investigated, or (2) the sample 
selection criterion established by the researcher can operate in a 
4 
manner similar to self-selection (Heckman, 1979). Additional examples 
of selection bias provided by Heckman (1979, p. 153) help to point out 
the extent of potential bias: 
As pointed out by Heckman (1979), data may be nonrandomly 
selected because of decisions by researchers, e.g., in the use of 
panel data it is common to use "Intact" observations. In this case, 
family stability becomes a sample selection criterion. The result 
is that such procedures have the same effect on estimated parameters 
as self-selection: "Fitted regression functions confound the 
behavioral parameters of interest with parameters of the function 
determining the probability of entrance into the sample" (p. 154). 
Care has been taken in this study to reduce any potential bias of 
this nature. Even though data are from a panel study, only two 
consecutive years are involved. The originators of the data set 
have dropped panel members' data if nonresponse occurs in any one 
year. 
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.,.one observes wages for union members who found their 
nonunion alternative less desirable. The wages of 
migrants do not, in general, afford a reliable estimate 
of what nonmigrants would have earned had they migrated. 
The earnings of manpower trainees do not estimate the 
earnings that nontrainees would have earned had they 
opted to become trainees. 
Likewise, for this study, the wages of able bodied workers do not, 
in general, provide a consistent estimate of what disabled Individuals 
would have earned had they been able-bodied. Differential character­
istics—age, education, etc.—may select some individuals into 
disability. Additionally, once disabled, differential tastes and pref­
erences may exist between the two groups. Luft (1978) found that one 
person's handicap is another person's disability when subjective evalua­
tion of disability status is allowed. Additionally, Luft (1978) 
investigated whether poverty "causes" impaired health or whether poor 
health "causes" poverty. He found a synergistic relationship. Persons 
with characteristics of an Impoverished background had a greater 
incidence of poor health and poor health reduced income, i.e., 
contributes to impoverishment. Luft's work predates the recognition 
of selection bias. Luft (1975, pp. 43-46, 1980, pp. 152-170), presumably 
unknowingly, fell into the trap of selection bias when he reported: 
...the "true" effects of health...are based on the 
difference between the current status of the disabled 
and their estimated status, based on how they would 
have behaved had they been well, taking into account 
the different socio-economic characteristics of the 
well and the disabled groups, (p. 43) 
...a set of regressions was computed for each dependent 
variable on the sample of well adults. The coefficients 
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of those equations were then applied to the characteristics 
of the sick population to estimate the values for the sick, 
adjusted for the differences in the two populations, i.e., 
what the earnings variables would have been, given the 
behavior of the well and the characteristics of the sick, 
(pp. 45-46). ^ 
Had the "sick" population been well, their socio­
economic characteristics suggest that they would have 
worked more weeks in the year than the actual "well" 
population, (p. 47) 
In light of current awareness of selection bias, Luft's findings that 
had the "sick" population been well, given their characteristics, they 
would have worked more than the "well" population is evidence of the 
direction of censoring bias when investigating the effects of impaired 
health on labor market activities. Using the regression coefficients 
from the "well" group and the observed values—already acknowledged as 
being different from those of the "well"—of characteristics of the 
"sick" to estimate the impact of poor health on the various components 
of earnings confounds the various previously used measures of labor 
supply with selection into the "well" and "sick" groups. 
Discussion of the Techniques Used to 
Correct for Selection Bias 
Gronau (1974) and Lewis (1974) are credited with developing the 
original, but restrictive, correction for sample selection bias. 
However, it was Heckman's (1974) article that integrated the various 
aspects of labor supply into one consistent framework regarding wages. 
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hours,and participation. Heckman's original approach used nonlinear, 
maximum likelihood functions to estimate a common set of parameters 
which underly the function determining the probability of working, 
hours of work, the observed wage rate, and the shadow wage. Although 
Heckman's original approach was a significant methodological advance­
ment, it was quite expensive to implement and, as a result, was not 
used in applied research. 
initiated in his 1976 article and developed in the 1979 restatement, 
Heckman presents censoring bias as another variant of specification 
error. This second method requires the estimation of a probit model 
which constructs a new regressor to Include in the original regression 
model. The additional constructed independent variable corrects for 
this possibility of selection bias or nonrandom sampling with respect 
to the observed dependent variable. Once again though, the procedure 
is complex and moderately expensive. 
Olsen (1980) has developed the correction currently being used. 
In place of the curvilinear probability model, probit, he has used a 
linear probability model to make the correction. The advantage of 
Olsen's model is that it requires regression techniques rather than 
an iterative probit in the first step. 
The General Model 
A general model that can be fitted to data for the entire sample, 
therefore minimizing the problems of sample selection bias, is developed 
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below. This model is adapted from the econometric model identified by 
Huffman and Lange (1981).^ The model is: 
T^j = ej %nW^ + gi AnWg + . j = L,H,M,S, (26)-(29) 
Tgj = 0^ AnWj^ + gg 2nWg + , 1,2 = head, spouse, (30)-(33) 
AnW^ = X^a^ + v^, n = 1, 2, (34)-(35) 
p„. = r" 
Mli 
D2i 
• t  
• i :  
•!: 
• £  
p Iff 
i = household index. 
1 Iff Ujj > -»2i«2 ( " ° 
-0 "21 i -«zi'z. "" 
Sli = I (38) 
P Iff < -ZiiSi 
i = household index, 
D = diminished health. 
= r I (39) 
.0 iff 1 "^21^2 
JlnW* = X^a* + n^Cl - N^g^) + 4^(1 - Z^S^) + V* (40) 
£nW* = XgOg + n2(l - Ngâg) + $2(1 " ZgCg) + ^ 2 (41) 
where j indicates alternative time uses : leisure (L), household produc­
tion (H), self-employment (S), and labor in the market for a wage (M). 
Vectors of random disturbances are indicated by Vg* 
^2' ^ 1' ^ 2 *  ^1' ^ 2" 
Additionally, Important contributions were made by Wallace Huffman 
in the econometric approach to be used in this study. The statistical 
procedure used is based on Olsen's (1980) correction for selection bias. 
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Equations (26)-(29) are the household head's demand for leisure 
(T^^), demand for household production time (T^^), demand for time in 
self-employment (T^g), and supply of time to the market for a wage. 
Likewise, equations (30)-(33) are the spouse's equations for demand 
and supply of the input time to the four activities: leisure, household 
production, self-employment, and labor for a wage (Tg^, Tgy, Tgg, 
respectively). The vectors in the head's and in the spouse's 
demand and supply equations contain explanatory variables which, in 
addition to own wage rate and spouse's wage rate, are appropriate to 
each individual's decision-making regarding time allocation. 
Equations (34)-(35) are the basic market wage-offer equations 
of the head and spouse, respectively. The vectors of explanatory 
variables (X^; X^ for head and Xg for spouse) determine each 
individual's market wage and are unique to each individual, e.g., 
own health status, own age, own educational level, and region of 
country. Market wage data are observable only when an individual's wage 
earner index (equation (36): for head and equation (37); for 
spouse) is equal to zero. When the wage earner index equals one, the 
random disturbance, for head and for spouse, exceeds the 
systematic relationship, for head and for spouse. The 
vector contains all the explanatory variables included in vectors 
Xj^ and X^ and any additional variables unique to explaining the 
work/no work decision. Likewise for the spouse, vector contains all 
of the explanatory variables unique to explaining the work/no work 
decision and variables previously included in vectors Xg and Xg. 
70 
The second source of bias Is the nonrandom occurrence of disability. 
The sample selection criterion that causes censoring is the presence 
of disability. Sample selection becomes a problem because of potentially 
differential wages faced by the disabled and able-bodied. Equations 
(38) and (39) for head and spouse, respectively, are the disability 
Indices. A value of one occurs when a work related disability exists. 
When the disability index for the head (spouse) equals one, the random 
disturbance (ggi) exceeds the systematic relationship ^^21^2^ * 
Once again, (Zg^) contains explanatory variables included in 
and Xg (Xg and Xg), an additional variable unique to predicting the 
Incidence of disability, i.e., occupation of head (spouse). 
To correct for the problem of selection bias in the work/no work 
decision and the nonrandom occurrence of disability, the predicted 
probability of an individual working a positive number of hours, 
(1 - , n = 1,2, and the predicted probability of not being 
disabled, (1 - Z^^d^), n = 1,2, respectively, are added as explanatory 
variables to the "modified wage equations" (40) and (41) (Olsen, 1980). 
The random disturbances and of equations (40) and (41) can be . 
heteroschedastlc but create no problem in this model since statistical 
testing of the coefficients is inappropriate for the purposes of this 
study. 
This chapter Involves the empirical estimation of equations 
(36)-(41). The estimation procedure is used to obtain the shadow price 
of time for all individuals regardless of whether they are in the labor 
71 
market for a wage. The empirical estimate of intrafamlllal time alloca­
tion, the estimation of equations (26)-(33), is reserved for discussion 
in the following chapter where the shadow price of time will be included 
as an explanatory variable. 
The Estimation Model 
A measure of the marginal productivity of time is not observable 
in all activities. However, the general model presented here can be 
fitted to data for all individuals—wage earners and others, disabled 
and able-bodied—to provide empirical estimates of the shadow price 
of time in all uses. The empirical model is: 
T^j = So + PiAGEj^ + PaAGEAGEj^ + ggAGE^ + Bi*AGEAGEg + ggEDUC^ 
+ ggEDUCg + PyHEALIMIT + ggEDlLIMIT + ggYRSDIS 
+ 3ioNUMHHMEM + eiiAGECHILD + 012NUMCHILD + P13UEMPRATE 
+ In Wj^(l-t^) + Bi5 In W^d-tg) + 3i6 Vg(l-Tg) 
+ 3I7 Vj(l-T^) + 3I8SELF^ + 3I9REGION2 + 320REGION3 
+ 321REGION4 + 322 PgD + (26')-(33') 
In W^(l-t^) = «0 + ajAGEj^ + o^EDUC^ + ogAGEAGE^ + a^REGIONZ 
+ agREGIONS + agREGIONA + aySMSA 
+ aaCl-Pig) + agCl-pj^^) + (34') 
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In WgCl-tg) = &o + «lAGEg + azEDUCg + àgAGEAGEg 
+ &i^REGI0N2 + à^REGIONS + âsREGIONA 
+ ôySMSA + &8(l-f2D) + (35') 
Puj = 60 + «lAGEj^ + 62AGE2 + 63HEALIMIT + a^EDUC^ 
+ 65EDUC2 + 56 PiD + 67EDILIMIT + ôgAGEAGE^ 
+ 69AGEAGE2 + 610UEMPRATE + 611NUMROOMS 
+ 612TRANSFER + (S13NONWAGEY + ÔjitNUMHHMEM 
+ Ô15 Vg(l-Tg) + 6I6 Vj(l-Tj) + 617AGECHILD 
+ 618NUMCHILD + 619YRSDIS + Ô2oREGION2 
+ 621REGION3 + Ô22REGION4 + 623WAGEARN2 + (36') 
p2M = 60 + ÔiAGEj^ + 62AGE2 + 63HEALIMIT + âi^EDUC^ 
+ &5EDUC2 + &6 ^iD + &7EDILIMIT + ^ gAGEAGE^ 
+ 6gAGEAGE2 + SiqUEMPRATE + &11NUMROOMS 
+ S12TRANSFER + &13NONWAGEY + âi^NUMHHMEM 
+ 615 Vg(l-Tg) + âi6 Vjd-Tj.) + 617AGECHILD 
+ 618NUMCHILD + SigYRSDIS + 520REGION2 
+ 621REGION2 + &22REGI0N^ + Ô23WAGEARN^ + (37') 
= Ço + 5lAGE^ + Ç2AGE2 + SsEDUC^ + ÇitEDUC2 
+ SgOCCUPH^ + G6OCCUPH2 + GyOCCUPHg + CaOCCUPH^ 
+ ÇgOCCUPHj + ÇjoOCCUPHg + SiiOCCUPHy + Çi20CCUPHg 
+ Ç13REGION2 + ÇhjREGION^ + ÇisREGION^ + SigAGEAGE^ 
+ Ç17AGEAGE2 + ÇieUEMPRATE + ÇigNUMROOMS + Ç20TRANSFER 
+ Ç21NONWAGEY + Ç22NUMHHMEM + Ç23 Vg(l-Tg) 
+ 524 Vj.(l-Tj.) + Ç25AGECHILD + Ç26NUMCHILD + (38') 
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Pgg = U + ^ lAGEg + 22EDUC2 "*• + t^REGIONg 
+ SgREGIONg + ggREGION^ + SyOCCUPW^ + GgOCCUPWg 
+ SgOCCUPWg + GioOCCUPW^ + ^ nOCCUPW^ 
+ ÇiaOCCUPWg + ÇiaOCCUPW^ + 5% (39') 
In W*(l-t^) = «0 + a*AGE^ + o^EDUC^ + a^AGEAGEj^ + a^REGIONg 
+ OgREGIONg + agREGION^ + aySMSA 
+ a8(l-0j^jj) + 09(1-0^^) + (40') 
In ^ ^(l-tg) = a* + &iAGEg + âgEDUCg + âtAGEAGEg 
"k ii "k 
+ &4REGION2 + ogREGIONg + agREGION^ 
+ àySMSA + &8(1-pJd^ + aS(l-p^^) + V* (41') 
i = 1,2 = H,W = head, spouse; 
j = M,S,H,L (market, self-employed, household, leisure). 
The model is estimated separately for Blacks and non-Blacks. The 
total number of equations in the system is seven for non-Blacks and six 
for Blacks. No Black spouses report time in self-employment. For non-
Black spouses and Black heads of household, too few respondents report 
time in self-employment to include separate equations. Time allocated 
to work for money Includes time in the labor market and self-employment 
with a dummy variable, SELF^, included for non-Black spouses and Black 
heads of household. 
Equations (38') and (39') are estimated prior to estimating (36') 
and (37') so the predicted probability of being disabled can be Included 
as a regressor in estimating the probability of not being a wage earner. 
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The probability of the spouse being disabled does not contain all 
variables to be used In the time allocations because selection bias Is 
not operating in that Instance. In the preceeding model is coded 
with a value of one (1) if the individual reports a disability and 
zero (0) if not. In the index used to predict the probability that an 
individual is a wage earner a value of one (1) is coded if the 
Individual is in the market. Therefore, when the coefficients from 
equations (40') and (41') are used to estimate a wage rate for nonwage 
earners, using (1-^^^), estimated probability of being in the market, 
the value in the parenthesis is zero and the term drops out. The same 
is true fox (l-^^^j), estimated probability of not being disabled. 
Probability of Allocating Time to the Market for a Wage 
For the estimated parameters of the wage equation to be unbiased, 
the observed differences in wage offers for persons with Identical 
demographic and economic characteristics must not be systematically 
related to market labor supply decisions—the work/no work decision. 
Statistically it is unimportant whether one predicts the probability 
of being in the market for a wage, i.e., being in the labor market is 
coded a value of one (1) or as in the general model presented above 
not being in the labor market for a wage receives a value of one (1). 
However, it is essential, to statistically correct for selection bias, 
that when the natural log of the after tax wage rate is regressed on 
the Independent variables identified in equations (34)-(35), the two 
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Independent variables used to correct for selection bias must be the 
probability of being able-bodied and the probability of being in the 
labor market for a wage. 
Because it is intuitively more meaningful for the purposes of this 
study to predict the probability of being in the labor market was 
coded one (1) if the individual is in the market for a wage. The 
estimators generated using OLS and the linear probability model identified 
above are reported in Appendix C. For use in the wage estimation equation 
the estimated probability of being in the market for a wage is constrained 
to values equal to or between zero and one: (0 < l)» 
Probability of Being Disabled 
If the probability of being disabled is not a random occurrence in 
the population, the disabled might not face the same wage offer as the 
able-bodied, even if they were not disabled. The estimators generated 
using OLS and the linear probability model identified above are reported 
in Appendix C. For use in the wage estimation equation, the probability 
of being disabled is constrained to values equal to or between zero and 
one: (0 < 1). 
Using the functional form employed in the human capital approach, 
the dependent variable in the estimated wage equations is the natural 
log of the after-tax wage rate. The coefficients of the explanatory 
variables are then used to predict the marginal value of time for 
persons not currently in the market for a wage. 
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Head's Wage Equation 
Estimates of the head's after-tax wage rate equations are reported 
In Table 4.1.^ In terms of expected signs, there Is general agreement 
with other studies and labor theory. For all heads of households, non-
Blacks and Blacks, the wage function is Increasing in age of the head. 
I.e., the log of the after-tax wage rate increases with age. The 
marginal effects of this function are measured by age of the head squared. 
The negative estimated coefficient of the squared term indicates that 
the marginal effect of age on the after-tax wage rate declines as age 
Increases—a relationship consistent with theory and other empirical 
evidence. Both age of the head and age of the head squared are 
statistically significant at the 0.01 level for Blacks and non-Blacks. 
Likewise, educational level of the head is of the correct sign 
and statistically significant for both Blacks and non-Blacks. The log 
of the after-tax wage rate of the head is an increasing function of the 
head's educational level. The mean educational level of Black wage 
earners is junior high school. The mean for non-Blacks indicates 
completion of high school. 
Variables measuring disability or impairment are of the correct 
signs for Blacks and non-Blacks. For both races, the greater the 
probability of being able-bodied, the greater the after-tax wage rate. 
Interpreting the marginal wage rate as evidence of the marginal 
g 
Summary statistics of estimators are reported in Appendix D. 
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Table 4.1. Estimators of imputed wage for heads of households by race* 
Non--Black Black 
Variables $ t 8 t 
Age of head of household 0.087 12.30 0.058 5.13 
Education of head 0.032 3.09 0.070 4.41 
Age of head squared -0.00093 11.12 -0.00062 4.48 
Years head disabled -0.016 0.59 -0.0095 0.21 
Education-limitation 
interaction 0.055 2.14 0.16 3.78 
Health limitation -0.19 1.39 -0.45 2.55 
Northcentral region -0.0094 0.21 -0.16 1.57 
South region -0.13 2.86 -0.33 3.91 
West region -0.014 0.27 -0.23 2.02 
Distance to SMSA -0.0042 4.56 -0.0071 5.53 
Constant -1.446 -0.627 
R2 0.1751 0.2562 
r2 0.1684 0.2399 
F-ratio 26.04 15.73 
N 1485 561 
^Dependent variable is natural log of after-tax wage rate for 
heads participating in the labor market for a wage. 
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productivity of workers, one would expect the able-bodied to exhibit 
a higher marginal productivity per worker. This relationship is 
statistically significant at the 0.01 level for non-Blacks only. 
However, the t-ratio approaches statistical significance for Blacks. 
An obvious interpretation involves racial discrimination causing Blacks 
to be paid less than their marginal productivity even if able-bodied. 
The interaction of educational level and health limitation indicates 
for both races that higher educational levels increase the wage rate 
in the presence of a severe disability. The relationship is statistical­
ly significant at the 0.01 level for Blacks and at the 0.05 level for 
non-Blacks. In light of the higher mean education for non-Blacks and 
31 percent of the Black heads of household (as opposed to nine percent 
of the non-Blacks) reporting the occupation of unskilled labor or 
service worker, it is obvious how important even a small increase in 
the educational level could be in the presence of disability for Blacks. 
With higher levels of education come substitution of mental for physical 
labor. For both races, a severely limiting disability reduces the wage 
rate. For non-Blacks, the relationship is not statistically significant. 
For Blacks, it is at the 0.05 level. Years the head has been disabled 
is negatively associated with the after-tax wage rate. The greater the 
period of time the disability has continued, the less work experience 
would be expected to be accumulated. In that sense, a lengthier period 
of disability would reduce the wage rate received. 
In all but the northeast geographic region of the country, 
after-tax wages are negatively related to that region. There must be 
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some other factor involved with one or more of the regions that has 
not been controlled for. The only region for which the relationship is 
statistically significant for non-Blacks is the south. For Blacks, the 
south and west regions have statistically significant negative effects 
on the after-tax wage rate. These conditions are consistent with 
empirical evidence of, in general, lower pay in the south. 
Distance from the prominent employment center is measured by 
distance from the nearest SMSA. The wage rate is assumed to decline 
with distance from the employment center. The relationship between 
distance to the SMSA from the household's residence and the after-tax 
wage rate is negative,-as expected. Additionally, the relationship 
is statistically significant at the 0.01 level for both races. 
For non-Blacks, the greater the probability of being in the labor 
market, the greater the wage rate. For Blacks, the greater the proba­
bility of being in the labor market, the lesser the wage rate. The 
relationship for non-Blacks might be interpreted in terms of attachment 
to the labor market. Non-Black male workers exhibit a rather permanent 
attachment to the labor force—long periods of continuous attachment 
that generate longevity, experience, and higher wages. For Blacks, 
discrimination or lack of education and training places them in 
unskilled labor positions with discontinuous employment patterns. This 
less permanent attachment to the labor force results in a lower wage, 
even with a high probability of being a wage earner. The relationship 
between probability of being a wage earner and the wage rate is not 
statistically significant for either race. 
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In general, the important relationships and those with the correct 
signs are statistically significant. Relationships of questionable sign 
are not statistically significant. 
Spouse's Wage Equation 
Table 4.2 reports the after-tax wage equation for spouses.^ A 
greater number of coefficients for the non-Black spouses are statistically 
significant and of the correct sign than for the Black spouses. 
For non-Black spouses, the relationship between age and the after­
tax wage rate is positive. The age squared term indicates the function 
is increasing at a decreasing rate—an expected relationship. However, 
for Blacks the opposite is true. The function is U-shaped. The 
relationship is statistically significant for non-Blacks at the 0.01 
level and not statistically significant for Blacks. 
The wage rate is positively related to education for women in 
both races, a finding consistent with human capital theory. Black 
spouses have an average educational level of at least some high school. 
For non-Blacks, the educational level is slightly higher indicating 
completion of high school. The mean educational level of Black women 
is higher than that of Black men, but similar for non-Black men and 
women. Lower wages for non-Black women in the northcentral region and 
in the south are statistically significant relationships (at the 0.05 
level). 
7 
In Appendix D, Table D.2 provides summary statistics of the 
explanatory variables. 
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Table 4.2. Estimators of imputed wage for spouses by race* 
Non--Black Black 
Variables 3 t e t 
Age of spouse 0.035 2.91 -0.0022 0.11 
Education of spouse 0.17 12.31 0.14 4.13 
Age of spouse squared -0.00036 2.41 0.00026 0.76 
Northcentral region -0.13 2.10 -0.68 1.12 
South region -0.15 1.99 -0.93 1.50 
West region -0.13 1.85 -0.50 1.28 
Distance to SMSÂ -0.0026 2.19 -0.006 3.50 
Constant^ -1.859 -6.44 
R2 0.1818 0.2606 
R2 0.1742 0.2422 
F-ratio 23.78 14.1 
N 973 370 
^Dependent variable is natural log of after-tax wage rate for 
spouses in the labor market for a wage. 
^Included in the intercept term are the estimated probability of 
being able-bodied and the estimated probability of being in the market 
for a wage. 
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The greater the probability of being able-bodied, the greater the 
after-tax wage rate, regardless of race. The greater the probability 
of being in the labor market, the lower the after-tax wage rate. 
The fact that discontinuous attachment to the labor force results in 
lower wages for women in general may be what Is occurring in this 
relationship. 
Distance from major employment center, i.e., distance from nearest 
SMSA, is negatively associated with the wage rate for Blacks and 
non-Blacks. The coefficient is statistically significant for Blacks 
at the 0.01 level and for non-Blacks at the 0.05 level. In general, the 
relationships are as expected. No coefficients of a questionable sign 
are statistically significant. 
The coefficients discussed here are used to construct an imputed 
wage for use in the time allocation equations of Chapter V. The 
after-tax wage rate Is predicted for nonwage earners as a measure of 
their shadow price of time. 
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CHAPTER V. ESTIMATES OF TIME ALLOCATION EQUATIONS 
WHEN THE HEAD OF THE HOUSEHOLD IS DISABLED 
This chapter provides reduced form estimates of the household 
supply function for market labor, household demand functions for 
self-employed time, household productive time, and leisure when the 
head of the household is disabled. All equations contain the same set 
of explanatory variables to facilitate a simultaneous solution to the 
system of equations. All equations are linear in both the endogenous 
and exogenous variables. 
To be included in the sample used to estimate the time allocation 
equations, the head of the household must indicate a disability. The 
definition of disability for this study is existence of a physical or 
nervous condition that limits the type or amount of work an individual 
can perform. The determination of the condition is based on the 
respondent's assessment of health status. 
Table 5.1 provides summary statistics of variables used in the 
analyses of intrafamilial time allocation of households with a disabled 
head. Comparison of mean educational level and mean age across samples 
indicates that the heads and spouses in this latter, disabled sample, 
in general have lower educational levels and are older than are the 
heads and spouses of either the two-person household sample or the 
general sample including all individuals. 
For Tables 5.2-5.7, the summation across the time allocation, i.e., 
across the estimated coefficients, equals zero. The equations were 
Table 5.1. Means and standard deviations of variables used as estimators 
in time allocation equations for head and spouse by race 
Non--Black Black 
Variables Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev 
Age of head 45.81 12.49 47.68 11.85 
Age of head squared 2254.42 1082.32 2412.67 1055.31 
Age of spouse 42.86 12.72 42.97 11.63 
Age of spouse squared 1998.36 1054.36 1980.15 992.0 
Education of the head 3.7 1.85 2.15 1.49 
Education of the spouse 3.7 1.52 2.69 1.31 
Probability of disabled spouse 0.031 0.024 0.067 0.047 
Health limitation of head 0.88 0.32 0.95 0.22 
Education-limitation inter­
action 3.17 2.07 2.032 1.55 
Years head disabled 2.95 1.34 2.67 1.36 
Number of household adults 0.3 0.59 0.64 1.01 
Age of youngest child 4.53 5.61 4.99 5.19 
Number of children 1.44 1.7 3.01 2.66 
Northcentral region 0.22 0.42 0.15 0.36 
South region 0.32 0.47 0.73 0.45 
West region 0.22 0.41 0.074 0.26 
Unemployment rate 0.061 0.02 0.057 0.019 
Whether spouse self-employed 0.019 0.14 - -
Whether head self-employed* - - 0.042 0.2 
^Because of too few self-employed Blacks, but a sufficient number 
of non-Blacks being self employed for a separate time allocation, this 
variable is used for Blacks only. 
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Table 5.1. (continued) 
Non-Black Black 
Variables Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev. 
Natural log of after-tax 
wage rate of head 0.87 0.6 0.47 0.46 
Natural log of after-tax 
wage rate of spouse -0 .032 0 .73 -3.81 4 .27 
After-tax self-employed income 564 .38 997 .4 116.69 434 .64 
After-tax asset income 412 .18 1206 .7 40.64 177 .06 
Head's time in labor market 1310 .01 1103 .01 1204.91 1111 .01 
Head's time in self-employment 412 .51 1006 .62 28.07 206 .57 
Head's work time* 1615 .87 1053 .46 1139.19 1014 .47 
Spouse's work time 406 .16 940 .22 699.78 863 .69 
Head's household production 
time 253 .41 467 .56 177.72 329 .26 
Spouse's household produc­
tion time 1630 .68 857 .1 1644.25 835 .81 
Head's leisure time 6784 .07 1101 .94 7349.3 1076 .93 
Spouse's leisure time 6423 .16 1044 .87 6415.97 1088 .91 
N 269 95 
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estimated separately and without restrictions on coefficients across 
equations. The summing-to-zero property is because each of the equations 
is a linear function of the levels of the same variables and the total 
amount of time to be allocated by each person among the categories is 
the same—8,760 hours. 
Wage and Income Effects 
This study presents a model of household time allocation when the 
head of the household is disabled. The primary objective of empirical 
estimation of the model is to provide econometric estimates of own- and 
cross-wage effects and income effects due to changes in exogenous 
sources of income. 
Table 5.2 provides the wage and income effects for a non-Black 
household with a disabled head. In general, the results are of the 
expected sign and many are statistically significant. 
Interpreting the head's marginal wage rate as a measure of marginal 
productivity of the head indicates that, for non-Blacks, a decrease in 
marginal productivity, the wage rate, reduces hours worked, increases 
self-employed time. Increases home production time, and increases 
leisure time. The supply curve of labor is upward sloping and the demand 
curves for time as an input in self-employment, household production, 
and leisure are downward sloping for the non-Black disabled household 
head. The own-wage effects are consistent with expectations. The 
Table 5.2. Wage and income effects of intrafamillal time allocation of disabled 
nonblack head and spouse 
Exogenous 
variables 
w" 
T ime alloca 
Tg 
tion of he ad Time al 
•^w 
location o f spouse 
3T ** 
—r < 0 
3w 
3T 
< 0 
8w 
3T_** 8T* 
^ > 0  
3w 5-
^ < 0  
8T- 9T 
17'° 
3T_ Y> 0 
3w 
3T ** 3T_* 
3T ** 8T 3T^** 3T 3T^ 
3T„ 3T 3T^ 
®Where Ty = time allocated to work for money, 
Vs = Vg - T, 
VI = Vi - T, 
w = W(l-t), 
1 = head; 
2 = spouse. 
•Indicates relationship is statistically significant at 0.05 level. 
**Indicates relationship is statistically significant at 0.01 level. 
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disabled head reduces hours in the labor market, and substitutes 
self-employed time, household time and necessitated leisure. Each of 
these relationships is statistically significant at the 0.01 level 
except the wage effect on household production time of the head. 
Regarding the own-wage effects of the spouse, once again the signs 
are of the expected direction and each of the own-wage effects is 
statistically significant at the 0.01 level. An increase in the spouse's 
wage rate results in an increase in hours supplied to the labor market 
for a wage, a decrease in hours allocated to household production, and 
a decrease in the number of hours of leisure. The supply curve of 
labor to the market is positively sloped and demand for household 
production time and leisure are downward sloping. As the spouse's wage 
rate rises, ceteris pcvnbus, the opportunity cost of time in the home 
increases and she substitutes toward the market. 
The cross-wage effects of the spouse in a non-Black household are 
not statistically significant, but the directional relationships are 
quite acceptable. If the spouse experiences a positive change in her 
wage rate, the head responds by reducing hours worked in the market for 
a wage. For the disabled household this means a substitution between 
household members of hours in the labor market since an increase in her 
wage rate increases her time in the labor market and reduces his time 
in the labor market. The negative cross-wage effect of the spouse's 
wage on the head's market time is accompanied by a positive cross-wage 
effect on the head's time allocated to self-employment and household 
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production. As she substitutes her time in the market for his, he 
substitutes his time in the home for her time in the home. 
Cross-wage effects of the head's reduced wage rate in the presence 
of disability indicates that the spouse increases her labor market time 
substituting away from household production time and leisure time. 
All wage effects, own and cross, indicate that a reduction in the wage 
of the head will lead to increased hours in the market by the spouse. 
The head allocates more time to the home as the spouse allocates less. 
All relationships are consistent among themselves and with hypothesized 
relationships. 
Regarding income effects, increases in self-employed income (only 
the estimated self-employed income is ever used in the analyses) 
reduce labor market hours and increase the number of hours allocated 
to self-employment—or as is a problem with a variable at least 
partially endogenous to the model—the increase in income may be a 
result of increase in hours. As discussed previously, self-employed 
income has labor and capital components. Additionally, the head does 
not always generate the self-employed income. In any case, this "own 
income" relationship between income and hours in the same time alloca­
tion should not be over-emphasized. The combined relationships seem 
to be consistent and correct. An increase in self-employed income 
reduces hours in household production and leisure. The income effect of 
self-employed income on leisure indicates that, at least in terms of 
self-employed income, leisure is an inferior good. For the spouse, the 
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the income effect on leisure is reversed. Leisure is a normal good 
in its response to a change in self-employed income. An increase in 
self-employed income of the household reduces work effort of the spouse 
and increases home production time. 
Likewise, an increase in income from financial assets reduces the 
spouse's market time and increases home production hours. However, 
leisure is an inferior good in its response to asset income. This 
relationship has been explained in a manner quite consistent with the 
response here of spouse's hours. Amassing the financial assets them­
selves may generate utility. So, more effort is directed toward larger 
and larger amounts of accumulated assets by these persons. 
For the head, once again market hours are reduced with increases 
in asset income. This relationship is intuitively acceptable. A positive 
relationship between asset income and self-employment hours is acceptable 
given, once again, the possible preference for wealth accumulation with 
capital investment similar to financial investment is understandable. 
For the head of the household who Is disabled, leisure is a normal 
good for asset income, but not self-employed income—an understandable 
relationship for business persons who work long hours. Overall, the 
own- and cross-wage effects and selected income effects are quite good. 
Less striking are the wage and income effects for Black households. 
The relatively small sample size for Blacks with a disabled head makes 
identification of subtle relationships quite difficult. The direction 
of the relationships is generally acceptable. For both the head and 
spouse, an increase in the wage rate increases hours worked outside the 
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Table 5.3. Wage and Income effects of Intrafamlllal time allocation of 
disabled Black head and spouse 
Exogenous 
variables 
wl 
Time a llocation of head Time al 
& 
location o f spouse 
^ > 0  
aw 
3T * 
1 7 -
^ > 0  
8w 3" 
^ > 0  
3w 
5 > -
3T^ 
- i <  0 
3w 3 > '  3" 
4 < .  
9w 
3T^ ar * 
4 
ST, 
- ^ < 0  
*Where Tjj = time allocated to work for money, 
Vs = Vs - T, 
Vi = Vt - T, 
w = W(l-t), 
1 = head, 
2 = spouse. 
*Indicates relationship is statistically significant at 0.05 level. 
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home. Or, in the case of a disabled Black head, reduced marginal 
productivity reduces work time. If marginal productivity of the head 
Is reduced, hours of household production and hours of leisure Increase 
for the head. The hypothesized relationship has been reinforced. 
The spouse's hours of work outside the home are a positive function 
of her wage rate. As the opportunity cost of time allocated to home 
production Increases, time In home production decreases. Market goods 
are substituted for home-produced goods. Of questionable existence 
Is the rising demand for leisure curve with an also rising supply of 
labor curve. Cross-wage effects for Blacks Indicate that substitution 
between head and spouse of time In market work does not follow from the 
head being disabled. An Increase In the spouse's wage rate results 
In an Increase In hours of market work and hours In home production for 
the head. Hours of leisure are reduced. An Increase In the head's 
wage rate Increases the spouse's hours of market work and of leisure, 
but reduces household production for the spouse. This relationship Is 
Interpreted to Indicate that when the head's wages decrease with 
decreased marginal productivity due to disability, household production 
time of the spouse Increases—a switch from market to home goods— 
because of the reduced Income. Increased home production time comes 
from reduced leisure time of the spouse. 
Income effects of self-employed Income must be taken lightly due 
to the small number of self-employed Black heads of households. Some 
of the signs for time use for the head seem backwards. As It Is, an 
Increase In self-employed Income Increases market work—probably due to 
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the combining of labor and self-employed time into one variable. An 
increase in self-employed income increases home production time of the 
head and reduces leisure. For the spouse, an increase in self-employed 
income reduces her market work. There are no self-employed Black spouses 
so it is a reasonable response. As for the head, an increase in self-
employed income increases home production time and reduces leisure. 
An increase in asset income increases market work and household produc­
tion hours for the head and leisure for the spouse. An increase in 
asset income reduces leisure for the head and reduces market work and 
household production for the spouse. It appears that for the spouse 
an increase in asset income means buy market goods with the increased 
income and buy leisure, also. First of all, buying leisure is consistent 
with leisure being a normal good. Reducing hours in the market and 
in home production means using the asset income increase to finance 
goods rather than through market work generating dollars or through 
household production. For Blacks, only two coefficients of the wage 
and income effects are statistically significant. One is the negative 
effect on leisure of a decrease in the wage rate due to disability. The 
other is an increase in household production by the spouse due to an 
increase in self-employed income of the household. Many of the 
signs are quite reasonable and the lack of statistical significance 
may be due to the small sample size. 
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Control Variables 
The remaining variables performed generally as expected for a sample 
of households with a disabled head who Is less than 65 years of age. 
Tables 5.4-5.7 provide estimators of Intrafamlllal time allocation for 
head and spouse by race. 
For non-Black heads of households, age of the head is positively 
related to labor market time and home time, but negatively related to 
self-employed time and leisure time. The shape of these functions, 
each time allocation as a function of age, is further described by the 
age squared variable. Labor market time Increases at a decreasing 
rate as does home time. Self-employed time as a function of age decreases 
at an increasing rate and leisure time decreases at a decreasing rate. 
For Black heads of households, work for money time as a function 
of age decreases at a decreasing rate. Home production time and leisure 
time are increasing functions of age and increase at a decreasing rate. 
Alternative time allocations of spouses as a function of their 
own age are similar. Work for money time by non-Black and labor market 
time by Black spouses are each functions that increase at a decreasing 
rate. Leisure time functions for both race categories are decreasing 
at a decreasing rate. Home production time of non-Blacks is a positive 
function of the spouse's own age and a decreasing function for Blacks. 
For spouses, in general, the older the head of the household, the more 
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Table 5.4. Estimators of equations for supply of labor to the market for 
a wage and demand for self-employed time, household time, and 
leisure for non-Black heads of households* 
Labor market Self-employed Home Leisure 
Constant 532.12 270.13 437.82 7519.94 
Age of head 92.67 
(1.46) 
-13.19 
(0.23) 
19.13 
(0.54) 
-98.61 
(1.32) 
Age of head squared -0.97 
(1.47) 
-0.02 
(0.03) 
-0.16 
(0.44) 
1.16 
(1.48) 
Age of spouse -52.17 
(0.78) 
22.36 
(0.37) 
-35.45 
(0.96) 
65.27 
(0.83) 
Age of spouse squared 0.39 
(0.54) 
-0.24 
(0.37) 
0.4 
(1.01) 
-0.54 
(0.65) 
Education of head -74.18 
(0.81) 
-29.16 
(0.35) 
19.14 
(0.38) 
84.19 
(0.78) 
Education of spouse -16.34 
(0.29) 
56.23 
(1.10) 
19.33 
(0.63) 
-59.22 
(0.90) 
Health limitation of 
head 
-421.3 
(0.93) 
-306.97 
(0.74) 
231.35 
(0.93) 
496.92 
(0.93) 
Education-limitation 
interaction 
98.07 
(1.04) 
18.53 
(0.21) 
-50.81 
(0.97) 
-65.79 
(0.59) 
Years head disabled 1.7 
(0.04) 
-51.14 
(1.64) 
30.2 
(1.34) 
29.24 
(0.61) 
Number of adults (ex­
cluding head & spouse) 
-42.89 
(0.45) 
43.22 
(0.50) 
-41.57 
(0.79) 
41.24 
(0.37) 
Age of youngest child 0.77 
(0.07) 
9.99 
(1.00) 
0.075 
(0.00) 
-10.84 
(0.84) 
Number of children -50.06 
(1.22) 
1.91 
(0.05) 
37.85 
(1.67) 
10.31 
(0.21) 
Unemployment rate 1688.37 
(0.60) 
7353.61 
(2.86) 
-2928.34 
(1.89) 
-6113.64 
(1.85) 
^ordinary least squares regression, t-ratlos in parentheses. 
Table 5.4. (continued) 
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Log of after-tax wage 
of head 
Log of after-tax wage 
of spouse 
After-tax self-employed 
income (estimated) 
After-tax asset income 
Dummy variables 
Whether spouse self-
employed 
Northcentral region 
South region 
West region 
Probability of disabled 
spouse 
r2 
r2 
F-ratio 
N 
Labor market Self-employed Home Leisure 
882.32 -316.94 -76.69 -488.69 
(8.17) (3.20) (1.28) (3.84) 
-27.55 69.21 27.61 -69.26 
(0.29) (0.80) (0.53) (0.63) 
-0.33 0.6 -0.028 -0.24 
(5.74) (11.15) (0.86) (3.43) 
-0.11 0.045 0.016 0.049 
(2.35) (1.04) (0.63) (0.89) 
-493.84 766.72 492.06 -764.95 
(1.14) (1.93) (2.06) (1.50) 
-40.47 -69.26 23.81 85.93 
(0.24) (0.45) (0.26) (0.44) 
184.00 16.45 -10.82 -189.64 
(1.06) (0.10) (0.11) (0.93) 
11.08 14.12 -66.67 41.47 
(0.06) (0.09) (0.71) (0.21) 
-775.57 481.19 -837.05 1131.42 
(0.17) (0.11) (0.32) (0.21) 
0.4604 0.4531 0.0797 0.2503 
0.4121 0.4042 -0.0026 0.1832 
9.54 9.26 0.97 3.73 
269 269 269 269 
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Table 5.5. Estimators of equations for supply of labor to the market for 
a wage and demand for self-employed time, household time, and 
leisure for non-Black spouses* 
Work for money Home Leisure 
Constant 239.26 1363.13 7157.61 
Age of head 2.14 -18.86 16.72 
(0.04) (0.32) (0.25) 
Age of head squared 0.074 0.091 -0.17 
(0.14) (0.14) (0.23) 
Age of spouse 89.47 31.35 -120.82 
(1.75) (0.50) (1.71) 
Age of spouse squared -1.08 -0.33 1.41 
(1.98) (0.50) (1.87) 
Education of head -35.3 6.26 29.05 
(0.50) (0.07) (0.30) 
Education of spouse -120.38 16.66 103.72 
(2.81) (0.32) (1.75) 
Health limitation of 9.85 452.41 -462.26 
head (0.03) (1.06) (0.96) 
Education-limitation -21.67 -93.15 114.82 
interaction (0.30) (1.05) (1.15) 
Years head disabled 24.59 -14.74 -9.86 
(0.79) (0.39) (0.23) 
Number of adults (ex­ -95.46 54.43 41.03 
cluding head & spouse) (1.31) (0.61) (0.41) 
Age of youngest child 1.25 9.46 -10.71 
(0.15) (0.92) (0.92) 
Number of children -54.95 52.5 2.45 
(1.75) (1.36) (0.05) 
Unemployment rate -3348.81 -596.07 3944.88 
(1.56) (0.23) (1.33) 
^ordinary least squares regression, t-ratios in parentheses. 
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Table 5.5. (continued) 
Log of after-tax wage 
rate of head 
Log of after-tax wage 
rate of spouse 
After-tax self-employed 
income (estimated) 
After-tax asset income 
Dummy variables 
Whether spouse self-employed 
Northcentral region 
South region 
West region 
Probability of disabled 
spouse 
Work for money 
-167.41 
(2.02) 
602.57 
(8.36) 
-0.08 
(1.78) 
-0.03 
(0.83) 
2226.48 
(6.71) 
12.65 
(0.10) 
305.05 
(2.29) 
244.43 
(1.87) 
-18469.94 
(5.17) 
Home 
91.4 
(0.90) 
-352.51 
(3.98) 
0.044 
(0.80) 
0.069 
(1.57) 
-64.05 
(0.16) 
-115.3 
(0.73) 
-244.43 
(1.50) 
-441.83 
(2.75) 
1975.2 
(0.45) 
Leisure 
76.02 
(0.66) 
-250.06 
(2.50) 
0.036 
(0.58) 
-0.039 
(0.79) 
-2162.44 
(4.71) 
102.65 
(0.58) 
-60.62 
(0.33) 
197.41 
(1.09) 
16494.74 
(3.34) 
r2 
F-ratio 
N 
0.5631 
0.524 
14.41 
269 
0.209 
0.1383 
2.95 
269 
0.3218 
0.2612 
5.31 
269 
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Table 5.6. Estimators of equations for supply of labor to the market for 
a wage and demand for self-employed time, household time, and 
leisure for Black heads of households* 
Constant 
Age of head 
Âge of head squared 
Age of spouse 
Age of spouse squared 
Education of head 
Education of spouse 
Health limitation of 
head 
Education-limitation 
interaction 
Years head disabled 
Number of adults (ex­
cluding head & spouse) 
Age of youngest child 
Number of children 
Unemployment rate 
Work for money 
465.66 
-220.72 
(2.01) 
2.23 
(2.00) 
268.56 
(2.41) 
-3.79 
(2.94) 
-683.52 
(1.18) 
33.16 
(0.33) 
-1661.88 
(1.23) 
703.1 
(1.20) 
110.55 
(1.42) 
-111.45 
(0.99) 
-0.86 
(0.04) 
31.28 
(0.62) 
6361.63 
(1.06) 
Home 
-1167.09 
5.41 
(0.13) 
-0.13 
(0.30) 
19.09 
(0.46) 
-0.18 
(0.38) 
252.03 
(1.16) 
16.71 
(0.45) 
333.07 
(0.66) 
-243.87 
(1.12) 
14.7 
(0.51) 
-49.3 
(1.18) 
3.39 
(0.46) 
2.17 
(0.11) 
161.00 
(0.07) 
Leisure 
8988.03 
235.44 
(2 .00)  
-2.32 
(1.95) 
-285.56 
(2.40) 
4.08 
(2.97) 
442.94 
(0.71) 
-55.53 
(0.52) 
1446.01 
(1.00) 
-453.46 
(0.73) 
-134.29 
(1.62) 
168.95 
(1.41) 
-1.69 
(0.08) 
-36.37 
(0.67) 
-5884.7 
(0.91) 
^ordinary least squares regression, t-ratios in parentheses. 
Table 5.6. (contInued) 
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Log of after-tax wage 
rate of head 
Log of after-tax wage 
rate of spouse 
After-tax self-employed 
income (estimated) 
After-tax asset income 
Dummy variables 
Whether head self-employed 
Northcentral region 
South region 
West region 
Probability of disabled 
spouse 
r2 
r2 
F-ratio 
N 
Work for money Home Leisure 
546.1 
(1.80) 
207.88 
(1.49) 
0.076 
(0.30) 
1.23 
(1.68) 
-20.71 
(0.18) 
20.9 
(0.40) 
0.031 
(0.33) 
0.37 
(1.34) 
-635.62 
(1.97) 
-272.65 
(1.83) 
-0.12 
(0.44) 
-1.62 
(2 .06)  
-126.67 
(0.24) 
1832.37 
(1.43) 
1960.08 
(1.46) 
402.34 
(0.45) 
20799.91 
(1.16) 
43.69 
(0.22) 
614.95 
(1.29) 
356.35 
(0.71) 
245.79 
(0.74) 
2906.59 
(0.44) 
192.06 
(0.34) 
-2754.22 
(2.01) 
-2685.29 
(1.88) 
-776.45 
(0.81) 
-28199.84 
(1.48) 
0.3949 
0.21 
2.14 
95 
0.1996 
-0.045 
0.82 
95 
0.3885 
0.2017 
2.08 
95 
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Table 5.7. Estimators of equations for supply of labor to the market for 
a wage and demand for self-employed time, household time, and 
leisure for Black spouses* 
Labor market Home Leisure 
Constant -1048.53 1658.93 8149.6 
Age of head 24.02 -31.74 7.72 
(0.34) (0.32) (0.08) 
Age of head squared -0.48 0.17 0.31 
(0.68) (0.17) (0.30) 
Age of spouse 96.43 -27.11 -69.32 
(1.36) (0.27) (0.67) 
Age of spouse squared -0.8 0.72 0.08 
(0.97) (0.61) (0.07) 
Education of head 80.4 407.66 -488.07 
(0.22) (0.77) (0.91) 
Education of spouse -39.54 130.82 -91.28 
(0.63) (1.44) (0.99) 
Health limitation of -155.17 1171.45 -1016.28 
head (0.18) (0.95) (0.81) 
Education-limitation -48.45 -428.24 476.69 
interaction (0.13) (0.80) (0.88) 
Years head disabled 36.34 -149.77 113.43 
(0.73) (2.11) (1.58) 
Number of adults (ex­ -43.33 1.39 41.94 
cluding head & spouse) (0.61) (0.00) (0.41) 
Age of youngest child 18.56 -16.81 -1.75 
(0.31) (0.93) (0.09) 
Number of children -22.7 81.11 -58.41 
(0.70) (1.75) (1.25) 
Unemployment rate -1205.2 -2601.38 3806.58 
(0.31) (0.47) (0.68) 
^ordinary least squares regression, t-ratios in parentheses. 
102 
Table 5.7. (continued) 
Log of after-tax wage 
rate of head 
Log of after-tax wage 
rate of spouse 
After-tax self-employed 
income (estimated) 
After-tax asset income 
Dummy variables 
Whether head self-employed 
Northcentral region 
South region 
West region 
Probability of disabled 
spouse 
Labor market 
83.34 
(0.43) 
75.25 
(0.85) 
-0.05 
(0.31) 
-0.15 
(0.33) 
326.88 
(0.97) 
187.82 
(0.23) 
110.34 
(0.13) 
70.29 
(0.12) 
-7824.16 
(0.69) 
Home 
-167.13 
(0.61) 
-59.39 
(0.47) 
0.45 
(1.96) 
-0.52 
(0.77) 
-698.47 
(1.45) 
-293.31 
(0.25) 
140.25 
(0.11) 
466.68 
(0.57) 
-7421.74 
(0.46) 
Leisure 
83.79 
(0.30) 
-15.86 
(0.12) 
-0.4 
(1.73) 
0.67 
(0.99) 
371.59 
(0.76) 
105.49 
(0.09) 
-250.58 
(0.20) 
-536.98 
(0.65) 
15245.90 
(0.92) 
r2 
F-ratio 
N 
0.6631 
0.5602 
6.44 
95 
0.2613 
0.0355 
1.16 
95 
0.5532 
0.4166 
4.05 
95 
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likely the spouse will be allocating time to labor time or time working 
for money. This relationship is also observed for Black heads of house­
holds; however, for non-Blacks the older the spouse the less hours the 
head allocates to the labor market and the more hours he allocates to 
self-employment. 
Education 
In each case—for head and spouse by race—own education is 
negatively related to market work and self-employed time for non-Black 
heads. In each case, except Black spouses, education increases leisure 
time. Remembering that these households have disabled heads and recal­
ling empirical evidence that indicates the incidence of disability 
increases with age, these time allocations as functions of educational 
level are consistent with previous evidence: education allows substi­
tution from market to home if leisure is a normal good. 
Health variables 
Given that each of these households has a disabled head, heads of 
both race categories decrease work time outside the home, i.e., time 
in the labor market, self-employment or work for money in general if 
their disability is limiting in the kind or amount of work they can do. 
These more severely disabled heads also increase their time allocations 
to home production and to leisure time. Non-Black spouses in a house­
hold with a head who is disabled show a positive relationship between 
time allocated to work for money or home production time and this 
indication of a limitation on kind or amount of work the head can do. 
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Leisure time Is reduced In this Instance. Black spouses In households 
where the head's work is more severely limited by the disability reduce 
time in the labor market and leisure, but increase time in household 
production. 
The longer the head has been disabled, the greater the number of 
hours allocated to the labor market or work for money by head and by 
spouse. This may indicate that as time passes, adjustment to the 
disability involves substituting kinds and amounts of work in order to 
continue employment. 
Age and composition of household 
The greater the number of household members other than head and 
spouse, the fewer hours the spouse allocates to work outside the home and 
the more hours she allocates to home production and leisure. The 
greater the number of other household members, the less time the disabled 
head allocates to the labor market or work for money. Non-Black heads, 
however, increase self-employed time as the number of household members 
increases. The older the youngest child, the more hours the spouse 
allocates to the labor market or work for money regardless of race. 
The more children in the household, the less time she allocates to these 
activities outside the home and the more time she allocates to household 
production regardless of race. 
Dummy variables 
For non-Blacks, a variable indicating a self-employed spouse exists. 
A self-employed spouse reduces hours of the head in the labor market 
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and Increases self-employed hours. If the spouse is self-employed, the 
hours outside the home are Increased and home production and leisure 
time are reduced. The head of a household where the spouse is self-
employed increases time in home production and reduces hours allocated 
to leisure. 
Black households with a self-employed head find the spouse allocat­
ing more time to the labor market and less to home and leisure. 
Strangely, the Black head of household allocates less time to work 
for money if self-employed and more time to home and leisure. 
Region of the country is positively related to work outside the 
home in all cases except for non-Black heads in the northcentral region. 
For Black heads of households, home time is increased and leisure time 
decreased regardless of region when the head is disabled. For Non-Black 
spouses, home production time is reduced when the head is disabled 
regardless of region. 
The greater the probability that the spouse is disabled, the less 
time allocated to work in the labor market or outside the home and the 
greater the hours allocated to leisure. For non-Black spouses, hours of 
household production are reduced and for Black spouses, hours of house­
hold production are increased as the probability of the spouse being 
disabled increases. The greater the probability that the spouse is 
disabled, the fewer hours the non-Black head allocates to the labor 
market and the more hours he allocates to self-employment. For Blacks, 
the greater the probability of a disabled spouse, the more hours he 
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allocates to the market for money and to household production with the 
time coming from reduced hours of leisure. 
Comparisons with Other Studies 
No other studies report time allocations for disabled heads of 
households and spouses for all of the alternative activities reported 
here. At best, several studies have estimated labor supply with leisure 
time being the alternative time allocation. For this reason, few com­
parisons between this and other studies can be made, but general 
comments and relationships between variables are noteworthy. 
This study, as does one of Scheffler and Iden (1974), indicates 
a positive relationship between duration of the disability and hours 
of labor supplied. Reasonable interpretations seem to be in terms of 
successful rehabilitation efforts or even without retraining or rehabili­
tation a substitution between occupations or jobs within the same 
occupation. From the same study by Scheffler and Iden (1974) of 
interest is their finding that when health variables were added to 
participation and labor supply equations, the explanatory power of 
education was reduced. This finding substantiates the findings in 
this study. To find education of little or no influence in time 
allocation equations is distressing in a model built on human capital 
theory. 
Many studies drop from their samples individuals reporting transfer 
income of the kind initially included in this model as noncontributory 
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income. Receipt of most of these kinds of income (for this sample 
receipt of Aid to the Blind and Disabled in particular) is contingent 
on nonparticipation in the labor market. Additionally, income from 
contributory nonwage income requires past participation and current 
nonparticipation to receive benefits. These sources include workers' 
compensation and the DI benefits of Social Security. A third source not 
usually considered to be endogenous is income from other relatives. 
However, even this source has been dropped from study because it is 
possible that earnings of other family members might reflect the house­
hold's preference for income as opposed to leisure in the hours equa­
tions. Here the variables are included in the probability of being in 
the labor market equation and probability of being disabled equations. 
In the former case, ability to qualify for such Income will, assumedly, 
lead to nonparticipation. Likewise, ability to qualify for disability 
benefits may well lead to positive statements regarding limitations on 
work that failure to qualify will not. Cases reporting these types of 
income are not dropped from the time allocation equations, but the 
variables are not included in the analyses. Inclusion of these 
variables in the prediction equations should remove any bias they may 
cause in the remaining independent variables due to its relationship 
to hours worked for persons experiencing this income source. 
In general, results are of an acceptable direction with a reasonable 
number of the coefficients being statistically significant for the 
non-Black group. 
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CHAPTER VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Summary 
Wage functions of heads 
For all heads of households, non-Blacks and Blacks, the wage function 
is increasing in age of the head, i.e., the log of the after-tax wage 
rate increases with age. The marginal effect of age on the after-tax 
wage rate declines as age increases. Both age of the head and age of 
the head squared are statistically significant at the 0.01 level for 
Blacks and non-Blacks. 
Likewise, educational level of the head is of the correct sign 
and statistically significant for both Blacks and non-Blacks. The log 
of the after-tax wage rate of the head is an increasing function of the 
head's educational level. For both races, the greater the probability 
of being able-bodied, the greater the after-tax wage rate. This 
relationship is statistically significant at the 0.01 level for non-Blacks 
only. The interaction of educational level and health limitation 
indicates for both races that higher educational levels increase the 
wage rate in the presence of a severe disability. The relationship is 
statistically significant at the 0.01 level for Blacks and at the 0.05 
level for non-Blacks. For both races, a severely limiting disability 
reduces the wage rate. For non-Blacks, the relationship is not statisti­
cally significant. For Blacks, it is at the 0.05 level. Years the 
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head has been disabled is negatively associated with the after-tax 
wage rate for both racial groups. 
Region of the country has a negative effect on wages for all 
regions except the northeast. The relationship is statistically 
significant for non-Blacks in the south. For Blacks, the south and 
west regions have statistically significant negative effects on the 
after-tax wage rate. The relationship between distance to the SMSA 
from the household's residence and the after-tax wage rate is negative, 
and statistically significant at the 0.01 level for both races. 
For non-Blacks, the greater the probability of being in the labor 
market, the greater the wage rate. For Blacks, the greater the probabil­
ity of being in the labor market, the lesser the wage rate. The rela­
tionship between probability of being a wage earner and the wage rate 
is not statistically significant for either race. 
Wage functions of spouses 
For non-Black spouses, the relationship between age and the after­
tax wage rate is positive. The age squared term indicates the function 
is Increasing at a decreasing rate. However, for Blacks the opposite 
is true. The function is U-shaped. The relationship is statistically 
significant for non-Blacks at the 0.01 level and not statistically 
significant for Blacks. The wage rate is positively related to educa­
tion for women in both races. 
Lower wages for non-Black women in the northcentral region and in 
the south are statistically significant relationships (at the 0.05 
level). 
110 
The greater the probability of being an able-bodied spouse, the 
greater the after-tax wage rate, regardless of race. The greater the 
probability of being in the labor market, the lower the after-tax wage 
rate. 
Distance from the major employment center, i.e., distance from 
nearest SMSA, is negatively associated with the wage rate for Black 
and non-Black spouses. The coefficient is statistically significant 
for Blacks at the 0.01 level and for non-Blacks at the 0.05 level. 
The coefficients discussed above are used to construct the shadow 
price of time for use in the time allocation equations. This study 
presents a model of household time allocation when the head of the 
household is disabled. The primary objective of empirical estimation 
of the model is to provide econometric estimates of own- and cross-wage 
effects and income effects due to changes in exogenous sources of income. 
Wage and income effects of non-Black households 
Interpreting the head's marginal wage rate as a measure of marginal 
productivity indicates that, for non-Blacks, a decrease in marginal 
productivity, due to disability, reduces hours worked, increases self-
employed time, increases home production time, and increases leisure time. 
The disabled head reduces hours in the labor market, and substitutes 
self-employed time, household time and leisure. Each of these relation­
ships is statistically significant at the 0.01 level except the wage 
effect on household production time of the head. 
, Regarding the own-wage effects of the non-Black spouse, an increase 
in the wage rate results in an increase in hours applied to the labor 
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market for a wage, a decrease in hours allocated to household production, 
and a decrease In the number of hours of leisure. As the non-Black 
spouse's wage rate rises, ceterds paribus, opportunity cost of time in 
the home increases and she substitutes toward the market. 
The cross-wage effects of the spouse in a non-Black household 
are not statistically significant. If the non-Black spouse experiences 
a positive change in her wage rate, the head responds by reducing hours 
worked in the market for a wage. For the disabled household this means 
a substitution between household members of hours in the labor market 
since an increase in her wage rate increases her time in the labor 
market and reduces his time in the labor market. The negative cross-
wage effect of the spouse's wage on the head's market time is accompanied 
by a positive cross-wage effect on the head's time allocated to self-
employment and household production. As she substitutes her time in the 
market for his, he substitutes his time in the home for her time in the 
home. 
Cross-wage effects of the non-Black head's reduced wage rate in 
the presence of disability indicates that the non-Black spouse increases 
her labor market time substituting away from household production time 
and leisure time. All wage effects, own and cross, indicate that a 
reduction in the wage of the head will lead to increased hours in the 
market by the non-Black spouse. The non-Black head allocates more time 
to the home as the spouse allocates less. 
An increase in self-employed income reduces hours in household 
production and leisure of the non-Black head. The income effect of 
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self-employed Income on leisure indicates that leisure is an inferior 
good. For the spouse, the income effect on leisure is reversed. Leisure 
is a normal good. An increase in self-employed income of the household 
reduces work for money by the spouse, increases home production time, and 
decreases leisure time. 
Likewise, an increase in income from financial assets reduces the 
non-Black spouse's market time and increases home production hours. 
However, leisure is an inferior good in its response to asset income 
for the non-Black spouse. For the non-Black head of the household who 
is disabled, leisure is a normal good for asset income, but not self-
employed income. 
Wage and income effects of Black households 
For both the Black head of the household and spouse, an increase 
in the wage rate increases hours worked outside the home. Or, in the 
case of a disabled Black head, reduced marginal productivity reduces 
work time. If marginal productivity of the head is reduced, hours of 
household production and hours of leisure increase for the head. 
The Black spouse's hours of work outside the home are a positive 
function of her wage rate. As the opportunity cost of time allocated to 
home production increases, time in home production decreases. Market 
goods are substituted for home-produced goods. An increase in the 
Black head's wage rate increases the Black spouse's hours of market work 
and of leisure, but reduces household production for the Black spouse. 
This relationship is interpreted to indicate that when the Black head's 
wages decrease with decreased marginal productivity due to disability. 
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household production time of the spouse increases—a switch from 
market to home goods—because of the reduced income. Increased home 
production time comes from reduced leisure time of the spouse. 
For the Black head of household, an increase in self-employed 
income increases home production time and reduces leisure. An increase 
in asset income increases market work and household production hours for 
the head and leisure for the spouse. An increase in asset income reduces 
leisure for the Black head of household and reduces market work and 
household production for the Black spouse. Buying leisure is consistent 
with leisure being a normal good. Reducing hours in the market and in 
home production means using the increase in asset income to finance 
goods rather than through income generated by market work or through 
household production. 
Conclusions 
Intrafamilial substitutions of time allocated to the market and to 
home production occur when the head o£ the household is disabled. In 
non-Black households, the spouse increases her market work while the 
head substitutes toward self-employed time and time in home production 
and away from the market. In Black households, substitution by head and 
spouse is from market work to household production. Blacks do not have 
the economic advantage of being able to substitute to self-employment. 
It seems that non-Blacks have greater options for substitution between 
jobs and between time allocations of head and spouse than Black 
I 
households do. 
114 
Educational levels of workers, historic occupational patterns that 
result in large numbers of Blacks being employed in unskilled labor 
positions, and racial discrimination contribute to, if not explain, 
these differential racial adjustments to disability. Efforts need to 
be directed toward rehabilitation of the disabled with additional 
attention to Black workers who become disabled. Institutional and 
cultural constraints in the labor market must be relaxed in an effort 
to find substitute employment for Black disabled heads of households 
and to find employment for Black spouses at a wage rate great enough 
to encourage market work. The presence of children in households with 
a disabled head provides an incentive to substitute unearned income 
for work effort. More incentives to encourage work by the spouse could 
be accomplished if child care costs were subsidized and vocational 
training supplied to spouses of disabled heads. In a social and 
economic environment conducive to working women, consideration should 
be given to making training available for spouses in households with a 
disabled head. 
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to this study and in teaching and work experiences beyond those required 
by the rules of academe. 
My friends and family have been supportive and understanding. 
The Home Economics Research Institute, through the efforts of Gordon 
Bivens, the Science and Humanities Research Institute, through the 
efforts of Charles Meyer and Wes Ebert, and the individual contributions 
by T. Hira, J. Gauger, G. Flowers, D. MacAllister, T. Bledsoe, 
K. Heimforth, C. Meyer and R. Thomas made completion of this study 
possible. As companion and helpmate, Dave has brought smiles, as 
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children and helpers, Jody and Cam have added diversion, as parents and 
models, Claude and Josephine Jones have provided stability and the 
desire to succeed. 
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APPENDIX A 
DISABILITY INSURANCE ADMINISTERED BY THE 
SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION 
Disability Insurance (DI), which was added to the Social Security 
System—Old Age and Survivors Insurance (OASI)—in 1956,^ provides 
cash benefits for insured persons who are totally disabled. To 
receive disability benefits under social security a worker must meet 
three eligibility criteria. He must have insured status, be totally 
2 disabled, and complete a six-month waiting period. 
Insured Status Conditions 
To be eligible for benefits, a worker must be "fully insured." 
Fully insured status is achieved if the individual's quarters of 
coverage are equal to at least the number of years elapsed since 1950 
or the year the individual attained age 21, if later, and before the 
The social security program was expanded again in 1965 with the 
enactment of Medicare—Old Age, Survivors, Disability, and Health 
Insurance (OASDHI). 
2 
The 1972 amendments to the Social Security Act reduced the waiting 
period for benefits from six months after onset to five. The recency-
of-work and quarters-of-coverage requirements were liberalized. Now for 
individuals disabled by blindness, the requirement of recency of covered 
work is waived. However, credit for one-quarter of a year of work for 
each year since 1950, or the year of attaining the age of 21 if later, 
up to the year of becoming blind is required. A minimum of one and 
one-half years of credit is required. In addition, Medicare coverage 
became available to individuals under 65 who have been entitled to 
disability benefits for two or more consecutive years. 
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3 
year he attained age 62. A worker with forty quarters of coverage is 
fully insured for life. In addition, a worker must have disability-
insured status. Disability insured status is achieved by having 20 quar­
ters of coverage in the most recent 40 quarters ending with the quarter 
of disablement. Persons under age 31 have alternative rules. For those 
aged 24 through 31, quarters of coverage are required in at least half 
of the quarters after age 21. For workers under the age of 24, six 
quarters of coverage in the most recent 12 quarters are. required. 
Determination of Disability 
The determination of disability is made by each state's vocational 
rehabilitation agency in accordance with federal statutes and regula­
tions of the Social Security Administration. For purposes of entitle­
ment, disability is defined by law as; 
The inability to engage in any substantial activity by reason 
of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment 
which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted 
or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not 
less than 12 months. A person must be not only unable to 
do his previous work in amounts of earnings and utilization 
but cannot, considering age, education, and work experience, 
engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which 
exists in the national economy, regardless of whether 
such work exists in the Immediate area in which he lives. 
3 
Somewhat stricter conditions for obtaining fully Insured status 
apply for men reaching the age of 62 before 1975. They had to have 24 
quarters of coverage to be fully insured rather than the 21 quarters • 
that would have been required with the 1972 amendment. 
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or whether a specific job vacancy exists for him, or whether 
he would be hired if he applied for work. 
Benefit Payments 
The social security program provides DI payments to beneficiaries 
in different situations: (1) for disabled workers under 65 years of 
age, or (2) dependents of insured workers disabled before age 22 who 
continue to be disabled.^ Additionally, dependent benefits are provided 
for: (1) unmarried children of beneficiaries if the child is under 18 
f 
years of age or less than 22 and still in school full time, (2) the 
wife of the disabled worker receiving benefits if she cares for a child 
that is under 18 or is disabled and entitled to benefits of his own, 
or (3) the wife or husband of a disabled worker receiving benefits 
if she or he is 62 years or older. 
For disabled workers with entitlement and eligible dependents, 
benefits begin after the initial waiting period has passed—six months 
in 1971. No benefits are paid for these months. Payments stop if the 
beneficiary dies (for surviving dependents survivor's benefits may 
start, however), if the beneficiary reaches 65 years of age 
(retirement benefits replace disability benefits), or if the 
^Social Security Act, Sections 216(i)(l), 223(d)(2)(A); Code of 
Federal Regulations, Title 20, Part 404.1502, pp. 340-341. 
^Also, benefits are payable to disabled widows and widowers or 
(under certain conditions) disabled surviving divorced wives of workers. 
Recipients of this type of income are not possible in the sample 
selected for this study. 
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beneficiary's health improves so he is capable of substantial gainful 
employment. 
Calculation of Benefits 
In 1971, benefits for each applicant were based on average monthly 
earnings (AME) in covered employment. The total taxable earnings of 
the worker were determined for each year since 1950 of the year after 
the worker reached age 21, whichever is later. The five years with 
the lowest earnings were dropped^—subject to at least two years 
remaining. Earnings in the remaining years were summed to get covered 
income. This figure was divided by the number of months in the benefit 
computation years to obtain the AME. A benefit formula was then applied 
to the AME to determine the basic monthly benefit, or primary insurance 
amount (PIA) (Meyer, 1979, pp. 33-34).^ In 1971, the benefit formula 
was 90.01 percent of the first $110 plus 32.74 percent of the next $290 
plus 30.59 percent of the next $150 plus 35.96 percent of the next 
Additionally, years during which the worker was declared disabled 
or qualified for the disability "freeze" provision were not included 
in the benefit computation years. 
^A new method of calculating benefits went into effect after 
January 1, 1979. The new procedure indexes benefits to inflation. 
Of primary concern is the fact that benefits are based on a worker's 
average indexed monthly earnings (AIME). Wages are indexed by 
multiplying the actual covered earnings of each past year by a ratio 
of average covered wages of all workers two years before the year 
in which the worker became disabled to the average covered wages 
the year the wage was earned. 
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$100 plus 20 percent of the next $100 (Myers, 1975, p. 93). Annual 
benefits increase periodically with increases in the Consumer Price 
Index. 
In addition to receiving the PIA, DI recipients with dependents 
may qualify for family benefits under conditions discussed above. 
An eligible spouse may increase payments by 50 percent of the PIA 
or qualify for larger benefits based on her or his own earnings 
record. Children's benefits are payable for dependent children who 
qualify. These benefits also increase benefits by 50 percent of the 
PIA. The total amount of benefits received by a family is limited 
by the family maximum benefit allowance (U.S. Department of Health, 
8 
Education and Welfare, 1980, p. 9). The minimum and maximum benefit 
provisions under OASDI in 1971 were $70.40 and. $295.40, respectively, 
for the PIA and $70.40 and $517, respectively, for family benefits 
(Myers, 1975, p. 94). Even with the upper limits, benefits sometimes 
exceeded previous earnings for low wage earners with dependents (Myers, 
1980, p. 9).* 
O 
Monthly benefits for workers disabled in 1980 range from $122 
to $552.40. Monthly benefits to worker and family range from $183 
to $966.70. 
9 
An individual who qualifies for monthly disability benefits 
under OASDI may have acquired the disability through occupational 
disease or injury that qualifies him for worker's compensation benefits. 
When DI benefits were established in 1956, duplication of benefits 
was prevented for disability benefits by an offset of worker's compensa­
tion benefits against the DI benefits. This provision was eliminated 
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Work Time and the Earnings Test 
Benefits for disabled workers and their dependents are, in general, 
not paid when the beneficiary is engaged in substantial gainful employ­
ment^^—including substantial self-employment services.The 1967 
amendment, which was still in effect in 1971, set the annual earnings 
limit at $1,680 (and the monthly test at $140). Additionally, a 
benefit loss of $1 for every $2 earned was in effect for the next 
$1,200 in earnings. The maximum earnings were $2,280 annually after 
in 1958 and an alternative provision was introduced into the OASDI 
benefit system in 1965. If a disabled worker under 62 is entitled 
to both social security disability benefits and worker's compensation, 
the total monthly payments to the beneficiary may not exceed 80 
percent of the average monthly earnings before the disability. Full 
earnings, including any amounts above the amount creditable for social 
security, may be considered when the average earnings are figured 
for this purpose. Social security benefits are reduced if combined 
benefits from social security and worker's compensation would other­
wise be over this limit. 
^^People disabled because of blindness (vision no better than 
20/200 even with glasses or who have a limited visual field of 
20 degrees or less) have a special measure of "substantial gainful 
activity." Persons receiving bneefits because of blindness in 1980 
could not have monthly earnings in excess of $417 per month as 
opposed to $310 per month as the earnings limit otherwise. 
^^According to Myers (1975, p. 73), while substantial self-
employment is not defined by law it is interpreted to mean more 
than 45 hours of work per month or as few as 20 hours if they 
involve management of a large business or are in a highly skilled 
occupation. 
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12 
which benefits are reduced $1 for $1 of earnings. The earnings test 
does not apply to the disabled worker since presumably he cannot 
13 
engage in substantial gainful employment (except in a trial work 
period). The earnings test is applied individually to dependents such 
as qualifying wives, so that the earnings of any one of those qualified 
cannot affect benefits of other family members (unless it reduces the 
family benefits below the previously achieved maximum payment). 
If at any time medical evidence shows that the disabled worker's 
condition has improved so much that he is no longer disabled, benefits 
are continued for three months and then stopped. If the disabled 
worker returns to work in spite of a severe condition, benefits may 
continue to be paid during a trial work period of up to nine months—not 
12 
An additional dollar of earnings actually produces less net 
income than a dollar lost in benefits. This is due to the fact that 
earnings are subject to income tax and social security taxes while 
social security benefits are tax exempt. A second comment is that 
since 1975 automatic-adjustment provisions apply to the annual and 
monthly exempt amounts of earnings. The adjustment is made in the same 
manner as the maximum taxable earnings base. 
13 
According to Myers (1975, p. 74), the law does not prescribe 
any dollar amounts for the upper limit of substantial gainful employment 
on the part of the disabled beneficiary. However, regulations have been 
established that do this. Regulations, in early 1974, provided that: 
When, over a period of time, the person has earnings as an 
employee averaging over $140 a month, this will ordinarily 
prove that he is not disabled for benefit purposes. 
Similarly, if such wages are less than $90, this will not 
bar him from benefits, while for wages between $90 and $140, 
individual consideration of the circumstances will be made. 
...the $140 amount was established when this was the 
monthly exempt amount in the earnings test (in 1968-71), but 
it was not changed subsequently when the latter was Increased. 
In September 1974 the regulations were changed so as to 
bring them in conformity with earnings (sic) test. 
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necessarily consecutive months. If after the nine months it is decided 
that the worker is able to do substantial gainful work, benefits are 
paid for the additional adjustment period of three months and then 
stopped. Therefore, it is possible to work and receive benefits for up 
to 12 months, even though the work is substantial gainful employment. 
If it is decided that the work being done is not substantial and 
gainful, benefits will continue. 
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APPENDIX B. ESTIMATED SELF-EMPLOYED INCOME; OLS REGRESSION 
RESULTS AND SUMMARY STATISTICS OF VARIABLES USED 
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Table B.l. Means and standard deviations of variables used in the 
estimation of self-employed income by race 
Non-Black Black 
Standard Standard 
Variables Means deviation Means deviation 
After-tax self-employed income 1824, .27 5049, .67 798, .44 2004, .85 
Age of the head 41. 40 13 .00 39, .50 11, .62 
Education of head 4, .70 1 .90 3, .50 1, .80 
Northeast region 0, .21 0, .41 0, .13 0, .33 
Northcentral région 0. 34 0, .47 0. 19 0. 40 
South region 0, .27 0, .45 0, .60 0, .49 
West region 0. 18 0, .38 0. 09 0, .28 
Other training of head 0. 25 0, .44 0, .23 0, .42 
Unemployment rate 0. 06 0, .02 0. 56 0, .02 
Sex of the head* 0. ,93 0. 25 
Age of the head squared^ 1885. ,11 1157. 71 
Number of cases 1450 296 
BQnly one Black woman reports self-employed income. Therefore, 
little or no variation exists in sex of the head of the household for 
self-employed Blacks. 
^When age of the head squared is included in the equation for 
Blacks, the education of the head variable becomes nonstatistically 
significant, yet the age squared variable displays no statistically 
desirable properties. Therefore, it is not included in the equation to 
predict self-employed income of Blacks. 
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Table B.2. Estimators of self-employed income* 
Variables Non-Black Black 
Age of the head 
Education of the head 
Northcentral region 
South region 
West region 
Other training of head 
Unemployment rate 
Sex of the head 
Age of the head squared 
Constant 
r2 
r2 
F-ratio 
N 
162.9 
(2.65) 
184.2 
(2.51) 
484.4 
(1.27) 
931.5 
(2.30) 
149.3 
(0.35) 
-360.2 
(1.17) 
-4705.7 
(0.67) 
1357.9 
(2.53) 
-1.3 
(1.87) 
-4694.0 
0.029 
0.023 
4.7 
1450 
37.3 
(3.53) 
43.7 
(0.63) 
-328.5 
(0.78) 
14.9 
(0.05) 
9.1 
(0.00) 
241.9 
(0.89) 
16150.8 
(2.20) 
-1782.3 
0.068 
0.046 
3.0 
296 
^Dependent variable is actual, measured self-employed income for 
persons reporting such Income; t-ratios are in parentheses. 
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APPENDIX C. LINEAR PROBABILITY MODEL OF DISABLED HEAD OF 
HOUSEHOLD AND LINEAR PROBABILITY MODEL OF DISABLED 
SPOUSE WITH SUMMARY STATISTICS OF VARIABLES USED 
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Table C.l. Means and standard deviations of variables used In the 
estimation of probability of disability of head of household 
by race 
Non-Black Black 
Variables Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev. 
Age of head 42.97 15.40 40.46 13.34 
Age of spouse 39.95 14.83 36.31 12.29 
Education of head 4.28 1.94 2.85 1.69 
Education of spouse 4.20 1.64 3.30 1.44 
Retired or student 0.10 0.30 0.07 0.26 
Professional or technical 0.15 0.36 0.03 0.17 
Managers, officials or 
proprietors 0.11 0.31 0.01 0.12 
Self-employed businessmen 0.06 0.25 0.02 0.13 
Clerical or sales 0.09 0.29 0.06 0.24 
Craftsmen or foremen 0.20 0.40 0.17 0.38 
Operatives 0.15 0.35 0.31 0.46 
Laborers or service workers 
of farm laborers 0.07 0.25 0.30 0.46 
Farmers and farm managers 0.04 0.19 0.01 0.10 
Miscellaneous; armed services, 
protective workers, etc. 0.03 0.17 0.03 0.16 
Northeast region 0.21 0.41 0.07 0.26 
Northcentral region 0.30 0.46 0.14 0.34 
South region 0.31 0.46 0.72 0.45 
West region 0.18 0.39 0.07 0.26 
Age of head squared 2083.39 1454.62 1814.64 1166.52 
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Table C.l. (continued) 
Non-Black Black 
Variables Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev. 
Âge of spouse squared 1816 .08 1309 .30 1469, .39 953 .78 
Unemployment rate 0 .06 0 .02 0 .06 0, .02 
Number of rooms 5 .47 1 .47 5, .03 1, .40 
Transfer income 716 .01 1781 .62 846, .15 1833, .16 
Contributory nonwage income 620 .89 1541 .09 327. 73 935. 77 
After-tax self-employed 
income 511, .86 973 .00 130, .29 396, .01 
After-tax asset income 447, .31 1512 .73 39, .67 201, .53 
Number of household adults 0, .23 0 .58 0, .55 0. 97 
Age of youngest child 3 .76 4 .89 4, .38 4, .47 
Number of children 1, .46 1 .65 2, .71 2, .25 
Disabled head® 0, .20 0 .40 0. 18 0, .38 
N 1898 629 
^If the head of the household is disabled, the value of the dummy 
variable indicating disability receives a value of one—zero, otherwise. 
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Table C.2. Estimators of the linear probability of a disabled household 
head by race® 
Non-Black Black 
Variables $ t g t 
Age of head -0 .0084 1, .27 -0 .00064 0, .08 
Age of spouse 0 .014 2 .11 0 .012 1, .48 
Education of head -0, .021 3 .35 -0, .0031 0, .29 
Education of spouse -0 .020 2 .96 -0 .020 1, .61 
Professional or technical -0, .27 6, .07 -0, .47 4, .43 
Manager, official, proprietor -0 .26 5 .81 -0 .48 3, .75 
Self-employed businessmen -0, .24 4, .69 -0, .61 4, .69 
Clerical or sales -0 .23 5 .33 -0 .56 6 .51 
Craftsmen or foremen -0, .29 7, .49 -0, .55 7, .53 
Operatives -0, .35 8 .57 -0 .49 7, .05 
Laborers or service workers -0. 25 5, .53 -0, .53 7, .91 
Farmers or farm managers -0, .30 5, .11 -0 .36 2, .30 
Miscellaneous -0. 31 5, .31 -0, .39 3, .68 
Northcentral region -0, .045 1, .79 -0, .028 0, .46 
South region -0. ,0029 0. 11 -0, .036 0. 67 
West region 0. 044 1, .62 -0, .033 0, .46 
Age of head squared 0. ,00014 2. 09 0, .00004 0. ,45 
Age of spouse squared -0. ,00017 2. 24 -0, .00009 0. 88 
Unemployment rate 0. ,36 0. ,82 -0, ,52 0. ,69 
Number of rooms in house -0. ,018 2. ,63 -0, .028 2. ,44 
^Dependent variable is dummy variable indicating a disabled 
household head by the value one—zero otherwise. 
Table C.2. (continued) 
140 
Non-Black Black 
Variables 6 t 6 t 
Transfer income 0.000004 0.66 0.000008 0.90 
Contributory nonwage income 0.000008 1.17 0.00004 2.32 
After-tax self-employed 
income 0.00002 1.74 -0.000005 0.12 
After-tax asset income -0.00001 1.93 -0.00004 0.52 
Number of household adults -0.023 1.16 -0.028 1.69 
Age of youngest child 0.0017 0.83 -0.0033 1.03 
Number of children -0.0047 0.75 0.0089 1.27 
Constant 0.496 0.584 
R2 0.1985 0.3113 
R2 0.1869 0.2804 
F-ratio 17.15 10.06 
N 1898 629 
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Table C.3. Means and standard deviations of variables used In the 
estimation of the probability of a disabled spouse by race 
Non-Black Black 
Variables Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev. 
Age of spouse 40.00 14.79 36.45 12.31 
Education of spouse 4.20 1.64 3.30 1.45 
Age of spouse squared 1815.52 1305.62 1479.61 957.06 
Professional or technical 0.10 0.29 0.03 0.17 
Manager or official 0.01 0.11 0.003 0.06 
Self-employed businessmen 0.01 0.09 0.002 0.04 
Clerical or sales 0.20 0.40 0.12 0.32 
Craftsmen or foremen 0.004 0.06 0.003 0.06 
Operatives 0.08 0.27 0.11 0.32 
Unskilled laborer or service 
worker 0.10 0.30 0.30 0.46 
Farmer or farm manager* 0.002 0.05 - -
Northcentral region 0.30 0.46 0.14 0.34 
South region 0.31 0.46 0.72 0.45 
West region 0.19 0.39 0.07 0.26 
Disabled wife^ 0.02 0.15 0.05 0.22 
N 1943 643 
%o Black women report an occupation of farmer. 
^if respondent indicated that the spouse is disabled, a value of 
one is assigned to the variable. 
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Table C.4. Estimators of the linear probability of a disabled spouse by 
race® 
Non-Blacks Blacks 
Variables B t 8 t 
Age of spouse 0.004 3.13 0.0012 0,34 
Education of spouse -0.0071 2.89 -0.0015 0.22 
Age of spouse squared -0.00004 2.77 0.00001 0.26 
Professional or technical 0.008 0.05 -0.086 1.55 
Manager or official 0.011 0.35 -0.069 0.45 
Self-employed businessperson -0.041 1.11 -0.070 0.33 
Clerical or sales -0.019 2.04 -0.066 2.22 
Craftsmen or foremen 0.10 1.80 -0.055 0.36 
Operatives -0.032 2.47 -0.061 2.11 
Unskilled laborer or 
service worker -0.019 1.66 -0.070 3.44 
Farmer or farm manager -0.034 0.47 - -
Northcentral region -0.002 0.20 -0.059 1.50 
South region 0.023 2.39 -0.060 1.78 
West region 0.017 1.63 -0.033 0.73 
Constant -0.035 0.085 
R2 0.0272 0.0513 
r2 0.0202 0.0317 
F-ratio 3.85 2.61 
N 1943 643 
^Dependent variable is the dummy variable indicating a disabled 
spouse. If respondent indicates that the spouse is disabled, a value of 
one is assigned to this variable. 
^There is no potential problem with sample selection bias since no 
sample is being chosen based on whether the spouse is disabled. 
Therefore, inclusion of variables potentially useful in explaining time 
use in the intrafamilial time allocation equations is not required here. 
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APPENDIX D. LINEAR PROBABILITY MODEL OF THE HEAD BEING IN 
THE LABOR MARKET FOR A WAGE AND LINEAR PROBABILITY 
MODEL OF THE SPOUSE BEING IN THE LABOR MARKET 
FOR A WAGE WITH SUMMARY STATISTICS 
OF VARIABLES USED 
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Table D.l. Means and standard deviations of variables used In the 
estimation of the probability of the head being a wage earner 
and estimation of probability of the spouse being a wage 
earner by race 
Non-Black Black 
Variables Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev. 
Age of the head 42.61 15.08 40.3 13.2 
Age of the spouse 39.62 14.57 36.17 12.27 
Health limitation of head 0.16 0.38 0.17 0.37 
Education of head 4.3 1.94 2.88 1.68 
Education of spouse 4.21 1.63 3.33 1.44 
Northeast region 0.21 0.41 0.073 0.26 
Northcentral region 0.3 0.46 0.13 0.34 
South region 0.31 0.46 0.72 0.45 
West region 0.18 0.39 0.071 0.26 
Education-limitation 
interaction 0.57 1.49 0.34 0.99 
Age of the head squared 2043.05 1408.65 1798.42 1135.73 
Age of spouse squared 1782.23 1272.92 1458.93 949.92 
Unemployment rate 0.06 0.02 0.058 0.01Î 
Number of rooms in house 5.46 1.46 5.03 1.4 
Transfer Income 712.74 1272.92 1458.93 949.92 
Contributory nonwage income 594.7 1502.91 322.1 935.34 
Estimated after-tax 
self-employed income 480.53 946.57 110.58 374.16 
After-tax asset income 437.16 1508.32 41.08 205.33 
Age of youngest child 3.79 4.9 4.37 4.46 
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Table D.l. (continued) 
Non-Black Black 
Variables Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev. 
Number of children 1, .48 1, .65 2, .69 2, .24 
Number of household adults 0 .23 0, .58 0 .54 0, .97 
Years head disabled 0, .57 1, .31 0, .46 1, .14 
Probability of disabled head 0 .2 0, .17 0 .18 0, .21 
Probability of disabled spouse 0, .02 0, .02 0, .05 0, .05 
Wage earner head® 0. ,76 0. 42 0, .87 0, .34 
Wage earner spouse® 0, .49 0. 50 0, .57 0, .5 
N 1814 605 
^The appropriate dummy variable used as the dependent variable In 
the linear probability model receives a value of one If the head or If the 
spouse Is In the labor market for a wage—zero otherwise. 
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Table D.2. Estimators of the linear probability of the head of the 
household being in the labor market for a wage by race* 
Non-Black Black 
Variables g t g t 
Constant 1.152 0.973 
Age of the head -0.015 3.00 -0.0098 1.71 
Age of the spouse 0.041 7.86 0.026 4.82 
Health limitation of head 0.061 1.38 -0.12 1.98 
Education of head -0.017 3.89 0.016 2.29 
Education of spouse -0.05 9.64 -0.032 3.86 
Northcentral region -0.089 4.92 -0.062 1.53 
South region 0.031 1.69 -0.05 1.40 
West region -.16 8.19 -0.033 0.69 
Education-limitation 
interaction -0.012 1.45 0.0083 0.52 
Age of the head squared 0.00031 5.90 0.00013 1.99 
Age of spouse squared -0.00048 8.26 -0.00017 2.52 
Unemployment rate 0.59 1.87 -0.26 0.51 
Number of rooms in house -0.051 10.09 -0.036 4.45 
Transfer income 0.00002 4.04 0.000006 1.00 
Contributory nonwage income 0.00001 2.62 0.00005 3.80 
Estimated after-tax 
self-employed income -0.00019 27.70 -0.00035 14.05 
After-tax asset income -0.00003 8.16 -0.00009 1.98 
*The dependent variable is the dummy variable indicating whether 
the head is a wage earner. If the head is in the labor market for a wage, 
the variable receives a value of one—zero otherwise. 
Table D.2. (continued) 
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Non-Black Black 
Variables B t § t 
Age of youngest child 0.00087 0.61 -0.0059 2.71 
Number of children -0.0073 1.62 0.011 2.29 
Number of household adults -0.079 5.42 -0.042 3.53 
Years head disabled -0.01 1.17 0.024 1.54 
Probability of disabled head -2.78 33.11 -1.59 18.33 
r2 0.653 0.6155 
r2 0.6486 0.6003 
F-ratio 146.48 40.44 
N 1814 605 
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Table D.3. Estimators of the linear probability of the spouse being In 
the labor market for a wage by race® 
Non-Black Black 
Variables g t g t 
Constant -0.287 1.685 
Age of the head -0.0039 0.50 -0.011 4.29 
Age of the spouse 0.074 8.97 0.012 4.79 
Health limitation of head 0.096 1.39 0.022 0.78 
Education of head -0.0053 0.79 0.0016 0.47 
Education of spouse -0.033 3.87 -0.027 7.26 
Northcentral region -0.0062 0.22 -0.85 41.88 
South region 0.38 11.74 -0.87 46.48 
West region 0.25 7.89 -0.50 22.32 
Education-limitation 
interaction -0.017 1.31 -0.0098 1.34 
Age of the head squared 0.00006 0.82 0.0001 3.47 
Age of spouse squared -0.00085 9.36 0.00025 7.68 
Unemployment rate -0.73 1.47 0.033 0.14 
Number of rooms in house -0.014 1.85 0.0019 0.52 
Transfer Income 0.000004 0.54 -0.000001 0.38 
Contributory nonwage income -0.00002 2.42 0.000005 0.97 
Estimated after-tax 
self-employed Income -0.00003 2.47 -0.000003 0.22 
After-tax asset income -0.00001 2.06 -0.00004 1.76 
*The dependent variable Is the dummy variable Indicating whether 
the head is a wage earner. If the spouse is in the labor market for a 
wage, the variable receives a value of one—zero otherwise. 
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Table D.3. (continued) 
Variables 
Non-Black Black 
e 
Age of youngest child 
Number of children 
Number of household adults 
Years head disabled 
Probability of disabled spouse 
r2 
r2 
F-ratio 
N 
0.0032 1.44 
-0.045 6.46 
-0.012 0.53 
0.00086 0.06 
-18.36 24.89 
0.380 
0.372 
47.7 
1814 
-0.00035 0.36 
-0.0025 1.14 
0.0053 1.0 
-0.0011 0.16 
-14.95 114.06 
0.9618 
0.9603 
636.2 
605 
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APPENDIX E. SUMMARY STATISTICS OF VARIABLES USED 
IN CONSTRUCTING ESTIMATORS OF IMPUTED 
WAGE FOR HEADS AND SPOUSES 
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Table E.l. Means and standard deviations of economic and demographic 
characteristics of heads of households In the labor market for 
a wage by race 
Non-Black Black 
Variables Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev. 
Age of head of household 39.44 13.21 39.03 12.51 
Education of head 4.47 1.87 2.97 1.67 
Age of head squared 1729.78 1136.85 1679.81 1035.07 
Years head disabled 0.40 1.12 0.33 1.02 
Education-limitation 
Interaction 0.46 1.41 0.27 0.95 
Health limitation 0.12 0.32 0.11 0.31 
Northcentral region 0.30 0.46 0.13 0.34 
South region 0.29 0.46 0.72 0.45 
West region 0.19 0.39 0.07 0.26 
Distance to SMSA 22.62 17.59 19.69 18.69 
Probability of being 
able-bodied 0.85 0.11 0.87 0.10 
Probability of being a 
wage earner 0.86 0.21 0.91 0.17 
Natural log of after-tax 
wage rate 1.20 0.66 0.83 0.59 
N 1485 561 
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Table E.2. Means and standard deviations of economic and demographic 
characteristics of spouses in the labor market for a wage by 
race 
Non-Black Black 
Variables Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev. 
Age of spouse 36.11 12.35 35.04 11.39 
Education of spouse 4.59 1.64 3.47 1.43 
Age of spouse squared 1455.9 972.52 1357.2 859.73 
Northcentral region 0.30 0.46 0.12 0.33 
South region 0.31 0.46 0.75 0.44 
West region 0.19 0.39 0.07 0.26 
Distance to SMSA 23.51 18.04 20.18 19.21 
Probability of being 
able-bodied 0.98 0.02 0.98 0.02 
Probability of being 
a wage earner 0.68 0.20 0.96 0.06 
Natural log of after-tax 
wage rate 0.64 0.70 0.29 0.67 
N 973 370 
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APPENDIX F. SUPPLY ELASTICITIES, DEMAND 
ELASTICITIES, AND INCOME ELASTICITIES 
OF HEAD AND SPOUSE BY RACE 
Table F.l. Supply elasticities, demand elasticities and income elasticities of head and spouse by 
race 
Non-Black 
Head Spouse 
Exogenous 
variables 
Labor 
market 
Self-
employed 
Home Leisure 
production time 
Work 
time 
Home 
production 
Leisure 
time 
Head's wage rate 0.67 -0.77 -0 .30 -0.07 -0.41 0.06 0.01 
Spouse's wage rate -0.02 0.17 0 .11 -0.01 1.48 -0.22 -0.04 
Self-employed income -0.14 0.82 -0 .06 -0.02 -0.11 0.02 0.003 
Asset income -0.14 0.82 -0.06 -0.02 -0.11 0.02 0.003 
Black 
Head Spouse 
Exogenous 
variables 
Work 
time 
Home 
production 
Leisure 
time 
Work 
time 
Home 
production 
Leisure 
time 
Head's wage rate 0.48 -0.12 -0.09 0 .12 -0.10 0.01 
Spouse's wage rate 0.18 0.12 -0.04 0 .11 -0.04 -0.003 
Self-employed income 0.01 0.02 -0.002 -0 .01 0.03 -0.01 
Asset Income 0.04 0.09 -0.01 -0 .01 -0.01 0.004 
